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Abstract
The chapters of this dissertation all fall at the intersection of economic history and public policy.
While the topics are historical, they all provide results that are important for current policy makers.
The first chapter is an introduction while chapters two through four are self-contained papers.
The second chapter of this dissertation, entitled “Did the War on Poverty Stop the 1960s Race
Riots?,” uses recently digitized records of War on Poverty spending to determine whether anti-
poverty spending was successful in discouraging the 1960s race riots. Using both a cross-sectional
instrumental variables strategy and a panel approach, funding for the Community Action Program
(CAP) is found to have decreased the number of riots by 15-60% and the intensity of rioting
by 45-54%. Within the CAP, politically motivated empowerment programs such as community
organizing and legal assistance proved more effective at halting the rioting than economic programs.
The results provide suggestive evidence that the root cause of the 1960s riots may have been political
disempowerment.
The third chapter of this dissertation, entitled “War Contracts and Break Points: The Economic
Geography of American Trade Unions,” examines the spatial and temporal evolution of the trade
union movement in the United States from the late 1930s until the present in order to determine
whether changes in union membership are typically random in nature, driven by locational fun-
damentals, or governed by increasing returns. In order to causally determine the relationship, the
compact between the federal government and trade unions during World War II is employed as an
exogenous, region-specific shock to union membership. The results indicate that increasing returns
to unionization have played an important role in the evolution of the labour movement. This result is
driven by unions choosing to invest their organizing resources in high-density states. Firms are also
less willing to fight union drives in high-density states. These findings have important implications
for the future of the labor movement, suggesting that a temporary government intervention in labor
relations can have a long-lasting impact on union membership.
The fourth chapter of this dissertation, entitled “The Impact of the Transatlantic Slave Trade on
Ethnic Stratification in Africa,” argues that the transatlantic slave trade increased the degree of ethnic
heterogeneity in contemporary Africa. Using both correlational and causal instrumental variables
analyses, we find an economically significant positive relationship between historical slave exports
x
and contemporary ethnic heterogeneity and fragmentation. This relationship is robust to changes in
the scheme for drawing ethnic boundaries and the choice of observational unit. The strong positive
relationship between ethnic fractionalization and slave exports found in this paper suggests that
increased ethnic fractionalization may have been a prominent factor in African underdevelopment.
The results also suggest that controlling for ethnic fractionalization will result in underestimates of
the impact of slavery on development.
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation looks back into the economic history of the United States and Africa to gain a
greater understanding of the causes and consequences of exploitation and the tools available for
working people to empower themselves. It spans from the era of the transatlantic slave trade to the
growth and decline of the American trade union movement. All of the chapters in this dissertation
are grounded in the intersection of labour economic methods, economic history and public policy.
And they are united in that they all strive to achieve causal identification.
The second chapter of this dissertation, entitled “Did the War on Poverty Stop the 1960s Race
Riots?,” addresses a unique period of empowerment and exploitation in American economic history.
Throughout the latter half of the 1960s, the United States came face-to-face with a history of racial
exploitation, as hundreds of riots erupted in African American communities across the United
States. And it was in this same era, that President Lyndon Johnson launched his unconditional War
on Poverty, which as a part of its mandate attempted to empower America’s poor. This chapter uses
recently digitized records of War on Poverty spending to determine whether anti-poverty spending
was successful in discouraging the 1960s race riots. Using both a cross-sectional instrumental
variables strategy and a panel approach, funding for the Community Action Program (CAP) is
found to have decreased the number of riots by 15-60% and the intensity of rioting by 45-54%.
Within the CAP, there is suggestive evidence that politically motivated empowerment programs
such as community organizing and legal assistance proved more effective at halting the rioting than
economic programs. The results provide suggestive evidence that the root cause of the 1960s riots
may have been political disempowerment and that the best policy intervention was to help empower
the disenfranchised.
The third chapter of this dissertation, entitled “War Contracts and Break Points: The Economic
Geography of American Trade Unions,” turns to one of workers’ most valuable tools for
self-empowerment: the trade union. It examines the spatial and temporal evolution of the trade
union movement in the United States from the 1930s until the present in order to determine whether
changes in union membership are typically random in nature, driven by locational fundamentals, or
governed by increasing returns. In order to causally determine the relationship, the compact
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between the federal government and trade unions during World War II is employed as an
exogenous, region-specific shock to union membership. The results indicate that increasing returns
to unionization have played an important role in the evolution of the labour movement. This result
is driven by unions choosing to invest their organizing resources in high-density states. Firms are
also less willing to fight union drives in high-density states. These findings have important
implications for the future of the labor movement, suggesting that a temporary government
intervention in labor relations can have a long-lasting impact on union membership.
The fourth chapter of this dissertation, entitled “The Impact of the Transatlantic Slave Trade on
Ethnic Stratification in Africa,” turns to the long-run impacts of exploitation across Africa. It argues
that the transatlantic slave trade increased the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in contemporary
Africa. Using both correlational and causal instrumental variables analyses, we find an
economically significant positive relationship between historical slave exports and contemporary
ethnic heterogeneity and fragmentation. This relationship is robust to changes in the scheme for
drawing ethnic boundaries and the choice of observational unit. The strong positive relationship
between ethnic fractionalization and slave exports found in this paper suggests that increased ethnic
fractionalization may have been a prominent factor in African underdevelopment. The results also
suggest that controlling for ethnic fractionalization will result in underestimates of the impact of
slavery on development.
Together, these three chapters bring new insights to the long-run consequences of historical
exploitation and the institutions through which working people may empower themselves.
2
Chapter 2
Did the War on Poverty Stop the 1960s Race
Riots?
2.1 Introduction
Rioting remains prevalent today and can be a massively destructive force.1 London faced five days
of massively destructive riots in 2011 while Paris and other French cities experienced weeks of
rioting in 2005.2 In this paper, I study the most prominent outbreak of American rioting, which
struck hundreds of cities across the United States in the 1960s. The outbreak of rioting in the 1960s
provides an ideal laboratory to study the causes of riots and evaluate the efficacy of interventions
designed to prevent them.3 The 1960s riots were enormously destructive (Collins and Smith, 2007;
Collins and Margo, 2007), however, we understand little about them.4 In particular, we have little
understanding of the effectiveness of government efforts to halt rioting. There is no economic
research that attempts to identify the causal impact of an anti-riot program beyond police or military
involvement in a developed country.
This study seeks to answer the question of whether a targeted government anti-poverty program
can be effective in preventing or halting rioting. In particular, I examine whether the Johnson
administration’s funding for the Community Action Program (CAP) was successful in discouraging
the 1960s race riots. Just as these riots began to break out across the United States, Lyndon Johnson
1There are a number of contemporary examples of rioting in the United States. The most recent example is the
outbreak of rioting in Ferguson, Missouri.
2In both the 2011 English riots and the 2005 French riots, the price tag of the rioting easily ran into the hundreds of
millions of dollars in short term costs alone (Dodd, 2011).
3It is a particularly effective case study as the 7 year duration allowed sufficient time for a government policy
response. More recent outbreaks of rioting have typically been days long at a maximum.
4To date, neither economists nor sociologists have managed to develop a causal explanations, although some
progress has been made. We know that the riots tended to occur in moderately poor areas (Carter, 1986; Chandra and
Foster, 2005; Myers, 1997) facing ethnic competition for resources (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1998; Myers, 1997). We
also know that enforcement played a role in that having either too few or too many police officers (Carter, 1987) could
contribute to the outbreak of rioting. And we know that the proximate cause tended to involve some type of interaction
between the police and members of the African American community.
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launched his “unconditional War on Poverty.”5 After the devastation wrought in the Watts Riot and
the escalation of rioting across the country, President Johnson turned to the Community Action
Program (CAP) and its anti-poverty mission as the federal government’s best chance to end the riots
(Cazenave, 2007; Germany, 2004), which were undermining the Democrats’ political agenda.6
Most CAAs employed a two-pronged approach to combating poverty and the riots: they empowered
local citizens through community organizing and coordinated federal grants meant to directly
alleviate poverty. Critics, contemporary and otherwise, have argued that the CAP may have actually
had a perverse effect and helped to trigger many of the riots (Cazenave, 2007; Sowell, 2004)
The empirical analysis employs both cross-sectional and panel approaches to explore the
relationship between rioting and CAP outlays. I begin with a basic series of OLS regressions to get
a sense of the correlational relationship. However, these results are inconclusive as a result of the
significant endogeneity inherent in the relationship between CAP outlays and rioting. To attempt to
resolve this problem, I take advantage of the panel dimension of both the rioting and CAP data to
conduct a a panel analysis of total and cumulative CAP outlays.7 These results also find a large,
negative treatment effect with a robust set of controls, time trends, and fixed effects. However, it
remains possible that, even with a rich set of controls, a non-observed time-variant variable is
correlated with the error term. Thus, in a third approach, I employ an event study analysis of how
riot behaviour changed after the initial funding of a CAA in a county. This approach is attractive as
it may solve the endogeneity problem. The results from this step indicate that the presence of a
CAA may have reduced rioting, but there is a meaningful pre-trend that cannot be completely
eliminated. Finally, I return to the cross-section and employ an instrumental variables strategy
based on Democratic attempts to expand their voting base to achieve identification. In particular,
the strategy takes advantage of the fact that the Johnson administration attempted to solidify their
political support in “growth” areas through greater War on Poverty spending. The results indicate
that CAA outlays significantly decreased both the number and severity of rioting and that outlays
had a long-lasting impact on riot occurrence. Depending on the identification strategy, general
spending on the CAP decreased the the number of riots by 15-60% and the intensity of rioting8 by
45-54%9. This is a remarkable treatment effect given that combating the riots was not the primary
goal of the program.
5This was truly a massive expansion in direct federal government funding to communities that was intended to aid
35 million Americans in their struggle to escape from poverty. It amounted to over 15 percent of the federal budget by
1970 before its dismantling, although a number of its more successful programs have lived on.
6It is important to acknowledge that the roll-out of the nation’s CAAs was already underway when the riots began
and their funding plans had, to some degree, already been determined for future years.
7I am able to divide spending by program type using this approach.
8As measured by an index of deaths, injuries, arrests, cases of arson, and days of rioting.
9The lower bound of the treatment effect comes from the panel analysis while the upper bound of the treatment
effect is from the instrumental variables analysis.
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In addition, I am able to divide spending by program type in the panel analysis. Community
organizing and CAA administration were the most effective methods of preventing riots,10 rather
than the provision of direct anti-poverty services. These results are suggestive of the possibility that
the 1960s race riots may have been driven by political disempowerment of poor African Americans
rather than purely as a result of economic poverty. Given the similarity of the recent riots in
England and France to the 1960s race riots, these results suggest that economic programs may not
be the most effective policy response to prevent future rioting.
2.2 Historical Review
2.2.1 The 1960s Riots
Between 1964 and 1971, race-related rioting broke out in hundreds of cities across the United
States.11 The riots occurred in cities of all sizes,12 but the worst rioting occurred in Detroit, Los
Angeles, Newark and Washington, DC.13 The riots came to national attention following the Harlem
Riot of 1964 and the devastation of the Watts Riot in Los Angeles in 1965. They continued to
intensify in 1966 and 1967, peaking in the aftermath of the assassination of Dr Martin Luther King
Jr.14 In Figure 2.1 of the Appendix, I plot the occurrence of the riots.15 The number of riots peaked
in 1968, from which point they began to dwindle shortly after the election of Richard Nixon.
The riots left dozens dead and thousands injured.16 Furthermore, there were thousands of arson
cases and other destructive acts. While it is difficult to quantify many of the long-lasting effects of
the riots we know that hundreds of millions of dollars in property damage occurred17 and the
majority of the damaged property was that of African Americans (Sears and McConahay, 1973).
10This is true regardless of whether the metric used is the number of riots or severity.
11These were not the first race riots in the United States. The severity of the rioting was matched by the race riots
that occurred during World War II. However, the 1960s riots were more frequent and occurred across the nation.
12Similarly, cities of all sizes realized different frequencies of riot occurrence. Approximately half of cities experi-
enced more than a single riot.
13The Detroit Riot of 1967 proved the mostly deadly of the era with 43 persons losing their lives. This is followed
by the Watts Riot in Los Angeles, which left 34 dead. The most severe incidents of rioting are summarized in the
Appendix.
14In the aftermath of the assassination of Dr King, the extent of the rioting was so great that Collins and Margo
(2007) are able to use the weather following the assassination as an instrument for riot occurrence.
15There is an important seasonal component to rioting captured in the figure: rioting overwhelmingly occurs in the
spring and summer months.
16According to the database assembled by Carter (1986), 228 people were killed, 12,741 were injured, and 69,099
were arrested.
17Estimates of the property damage have been created for some of the larger riots. For example, it is estimated that
the Watts Riot resulted in 40 million dollars in property damage. The Detroit Riots are estimated to have resulted in 45
million dollars in damage (Harris and Wilkins, 1988).
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There were also long-term consequences for the African American community in addition to this
property damage. Collins and Margo (2007) and Collins and Smith (2007) find that the rioting
caused a depression in the value of African American property in cities and worsened labour
market outcomes for inner city African Americans. The riots may have also hastened the white
flight from many of America’s largest cities (Boustan, 2010; Collins and Margo, 2007), which had
already begun. These are likely only a subsection of the substantial economic costs that many inner
city African Americans have faced as a result of the rioting.
Anecdotal and survey evidence (Sears and McConahay, 1973) collected in the aftermath of
several of the riots suggests that they were not planned occurrences. Rather, the evidence indicates
that the riots were spontaneous events triggered by some a perceived injustice (Bauman, 2008). The
spark was often a perceived injustice against the African American community by a police
officer.18 For example, the Detroit Riot of 1967 was triggered by a police raid on a “blind pig” in
the downtown core.19 The club had more occupants than the police had expected and, as they were
taken out onto the street, it drew the attention of people living nearby (Singer et al., 1970) who were
unhappy with the police action. The situation escalated into the most deadly riot of the 1960s.
Similarly, the Watts Riot was triggered by the arrest of a young man for driving under the influence.
During the arrest, his mother appeared at the scene (Sears and McConahay, 1973); a crowd
gathered and the Watts riot began.
2.2.2 The War on Poverty & The Community Action Program
The War on Poverty was designed and coordinated in Washington under the direction of Sargent
Shriver and the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). The program had its historical roots in
many of the programs of Roosevelt’s New Deal and its contemporary roots in Kennedy’s
Committee on Juvenile Delinquency.20 The Community Action Program (CAP) and its physical
manifestations, Community Action Agencies (CAAs), were at the heart of the War on Poverty,
being charged with coordinating the fight against poverty at the local level. The Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964 defines a CAP as a program that: “mobilizes and utilizes resources, public
or private, of any urban or rural [area]”, “provides services, assistance and other activities of
sufficient scope and size to give promise of progress toward elimination of poverty...” and “is
developed, conducted and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the
areas and members of the group served” (USA, 1976). The CAP was intended to differ from
traditional approaches to combat poverty in that the poor themselves were intended to serve as the
18Carter (1987) has studied the u-shaped relationship between the size of the local police force and riot occurrence.
19A blind pig is an after-hours club that illegally sells alcohol.
20The latter, in particular, served as the basis for the War on Poverty, serving as testing ground for many of the
concepts later employed in the War on Poverty.
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organizers.
In the original formulation of the War on Poverty, Community Action Agencies were not
envisioned as service providers. Rather, they were designed as coordinating entities, which were to
give voice to the poor. They would be independently governed by local government officials,
members of anti-poverty groups, and community residents. Each board was to consist of at least
one-third local residents, one third local government officials, and at most one-third representatives
of the private sector. This division of representation generally held in practice, although the
members were typically appointed rather than elected by the community. CAAs could be very
different on the ground: some were controlled by local political machines while others were
genuine, grass-roots organizations. Many CAAs were either founded or staffed by organizers from
the most prominent civil rights organizations including the NAACP and NUL (Paden, 2011). Given
their control over significant amounts of federal funding, there were regularly turf wars within local
political machines and civil rights organizations over the formation of new CAAs, their staffing,
and the allocation of funds (Paden, 2011).
In their initial formulation, these CAAs were to be tasked with three goals by the Office of
Economic Opportunity: to coordinate service providers, to organize the poor towards social action,
and to empower the poor by giving them agency over the War on Poverty at the local level. This
initial vision for CAAs, however was quickly transformed and they were given a new mandate to be
the actual service providers (Sundquist, 1969) with a de-emphasized coordination role. Even critics
of this transition recognized that service provision by CAAs would have a dramatic impact at the
local level (Brauer, 1982) by bypassing the exiting bureaucracy and getting resources directly to the
poor. CAAs were able to apply to the OEO for funding to offer these services to the community.21
A vast array of CAP programs tackled poverty from every angle: VISTA (Volunteers in Service to
America), the Jobs Corps, Head Start, consumer services, legal support to challenge existing
institutions, health services and many more (Levitan, 1969). There is evidence, however, that the
focus on service provision may have discouraged the organizing role that CAAs were intended to
play as initially envisioned by Sargent Shriver.22
2.2.3 The Interaction of the CAP and the Riots
The goal of the War on Poverty and the Community Action Program under Sargent Shriver was to
economically empower America’s poor by making them smarter, happier, and healthier. And it was
21Governors had the right to veto local allocations, however, all funding allocations were made directly to the local
CAA. In addition, the director of the OEO could override these vetoes.
22In a survey of more than 50 CAP program directors, Clark and Hopkins (1969) find that while most CAPs offered
programs such as Head Start or health services, only five CAPs operated programs with the goal of “organization for
community social action”.
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also the belief of President Johnson that “the only genuine, long-range solution for what has
happened [the riots] lies in an attack-mounted at every level–upon the conditions that breed despair
and violence” (Harris and Wilkins, 1988).23 Johnson essentially believed that a core anti-poverty
mandate would be successful in putting an end to the rioting. Economic empowerment, acting
through programs such as the Jobs Corps, health services, and even the expansion in the food
stamps program may have discouraged urban rioting through several pathways. For example, if
CAAs provided an exogenous shock to the income of individuals facing the decision to riot they
would face a higher opportunity cost of imprisonment. Rioting may have also simply been
signaling mechanism, as described later in this paper, for services and their provision removed the
benefits of rioting. Finally, jobs at CAAs may have been directly allocated to many of the poor
providing them with a stable income that would be at risk if they participated in rioting.
The other possibility is that CAAs’ efforts to politically empower the poor may have helped
prevent rioting. CAAs were governed, in part, by the local poor and may have discouraged rioting
by allowing the grievances of those in poverty to to be addressed. The poor were guaranteed at least
one third representation on each CAA council.24 If rioting was intended to make a silenced voice
heard, CAAs may have been able to meet that goal. The idea that rioting came out of grievances
against the state was held by many mayors. Mayor Lindsay of New York City created a special task
force, associated with the CAP, to be dispatched to poor neighbourhoods to determine the nature of
their grievances (Reeves, 1968). These grievances could take many forms: from poor housing and
sanitation to the rage felt by so many after the assassination of Dr. King. For example, in Newark,
the local CAA was governed by an alliance of militants and moderates. After the assassination of
Dr. King the leader of the CAA, Tim Still, paid 300 youths 5 dollars each to head to the ghetto to
remind angry residents of Dr. King’s message of non-violence. This act of community organizing
has been credited with preventing a deadly outbreak of rioting in Newark (Cook, 1968). This
mechanism would be consistent with the “social disorganization” hypothesis of rioting proposed by
Downes (1968) under which there exists a group of individuals who are somehow isolated from
society. As such, they are not significantly influenced by social norms and do not have access to the
institutions established to consider grievances. It would also be consistent with Lieberson and
Silverman (1965)’s “political representation” hypothesis in which a politically excluded group turns
to rioting or other violence to have their demands heard.25
While the conventional wisdom suggests that the Community Action Program either
23This mechanism would be consistent with the “deprivation” hypotheses presented by sociologists. The two most
prominent “deprivation” hypotheses are the “absolute deprivation” hypothesis proposed by Olson (1963) and the
“relative deprivation” hypothesis proposed by Gurr (1971). These theories argue that living in a condition of absolute
poverty or poverty relative to others encourages people to riot to improve their living conditions.
24If disenfranchised they had the ability to form a new private CAA that could then compete for federal funding.
25Additionally, it would be consistent with many political economy models in which the policy emphasis is placed
upon the “median” voter or factions are able to capture rents prior to their reaching the community.
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discouraged rioting or had a negligible impact, there are plausible hypotheses that suggest that the
CAP may have had the opposite impact. For example, Sowell (2004) argues that it is possible that
the efforts of CAP to empower poor African Americans may have helped trigger the riots or
intensified them. It is possible that CAAs created economic and political expectations that they
were unable to meet, resulting in frustration and rioting.26 This idea is raised by contemporary
scholars such as Clark and Hopkins (1969) who argue that “where such programs themselves have
been subverted or diluted, the response of the poor and their surrogates may be a rising frustration
and militance or a return of apathy”. For many of the poor, there was reason for frustration. The
promise of elected representation on CAA boards was often not realized as government officials
moved to appoint representatives (Clark and Hopkins, 1969). In many cities, there were power
struggles between the municipal government and the poor27 for control of CAAs. There is evidence
from the Watts riot that unmet expectations for the War on Poverty may have helped drive the riots.
According to Bauman (2008), early commentators agreed that the failure of Los Angeles to settle
on a leadership group for its CAA contributed to the Watts Riot. Mayor Yorty stated that “one of
the riot inciting factors [was] the deliberate and well publicized cutting off of poverty funds”
(Bauman, 2008) to the city of Los Angeles. Some have interpreted the Watts riot as more than a
rebuke of Yorty, but rather an attempt to attract federal dollars to Watts (Sprinkles, 1971).
The form of political empowerment itself may have provoked rioting as the CAP tended to
promote anti-establishment organizing. According to Clark and Hopkins (1969), CAAs’
effectiveness depended “on challenging that same order and transforming society itself,” which
could take on a variety of forms, including a riot. In 1965, CAAs throughout the United States were
issued a Community Action Program Workbook, which provided suggestions for aiding the poor. It
suggested that increasing the political clout of the poor was essential to community action’s success
and argued that “ organizing protest demonstrations” (Cazenave, 2007) was an effective method of
achieve this goal.28 Mayor Shelley of San Francisco cited this workbook at a US Conference of
Mayors meeting, claiming that “ OEO officials were attempting to incite the poor to engage in
social protest at both the local and national levels” (Cazenave, 2007) . In the aftermath of the riots,
many politicians and pundits came forward placing blame for the rioting on CAA employees that
the CAP had to defend itself against (Cazenave, 2007). At Congressional hearings, members of the
Newark city council and others accused CAA members of playing “an important part in setting off
the riots” (Cazenave, 2007) and inciting hatred against whites. There were articles in the press
covering efforts by the CAP to combat this discourse (Unknown, 1967a). We do know of cases in
26This would be consistent with the sociological theories of Berkowitz (1968).
27The poor were not without allies in these struggles; the federal government often sided with community members
rather than municipal or state officials.
28This workbook was referenced during congressional hearings as evidence that the Community Action Program was
politically motivated and militant.
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which CAP workers were arrested for inciting a riot (Unknown, 1967b); in addition there exists
documentation of several CAP rallies that escalated into rioting (Unknown, 1968). In addition to
the potential for violence against local authorities, there was competition for scarce resources
amongst official and unofficial CAAs in the same cities. Since many of these unofficial CAAs
tended to be based on ethnicity (Bauman, 2008), this competition could lead to violent
confrontations between these rival groups (Cazenave, 2007; Olzak et al., 1996).
These potential mechanisms for CAAs influencing riot occurrence are not mutually exclusive
and it is likely that each occurred in different communities. Next, I discuss a possible signaling
model that may underlie the interaction of War on Poverty funding and rioting and that is consistent
with these mechanisms.
2.3 A Simple Model of Riots as a Signaling Problem
I model the decision to riot as a community-level signaling model problem (Spence, 1973) in order
to to gain greater insight into the relationship between the decision to riot, poverty, political
disempowerment, and government allocations. This model is able to reflect situation under which
CAAs may both increase and decrease the propensity to riot.29
The agents in this model are the African American communities found in cities in the United
States. I assume that there are two types of communities: impoverished (θI) and well-off (θW ).30
These two types differ over their value of θ (θI ≥ θW ) , which is a parameter indicating both the
level of poverty and segregation (or simply hardship) in the city. African American communities
are aware of their own level of θ while the government is unable to view this variable directly.
Communities, however, are able to convey a signal to the government by choosing a number of riots
(equally interpretable as the intensity of riots) R, which are costly to undertake. Communities are
assumed to benefit from federal anti-poverty spending G, which is provided by the government. As
such, the normalized community-level utility is taken to be:
ut(G,R) = G−C(θt ,R),
where C is the cost of rioting. I assume that the cost of rioting takes the following functional
form:
29Applying a global games framework to rioting can also provide valuable insights into individual and community
behaviour.
30Note that these communities could similarly reflect markers of local political empowerment.
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C(θt ,R) = kt f (R)
where f () is increasing in R. ki is cost multiplier that is a function of θ that differs in
impoverished and well-off communities such that kW ≥ kI . This assumption is reasonable as the
opportunity cost of rioting should be greater in a well-off community. As is standard in such
models, I assume that the utility functions satisfy the single crossing property such that the well-off
community’s indifference curve always has a greater slope than the impoverished community’s
indifference curve.
If the types were observable the government would provide Gt = θt units of federal anti-poverty
spending to each community. If the types are not observable and there exists no signaling
mechanism the government will provide E(θ) = λθI +(1−λ )θW units of federal anti-poverty
spending to each community where λ is the proportion of communities that are impoverished.
In the signaling game, each city is given a type at random, after which each community must
choose a level of riots. The government then observes the number of riots and decides upon a
distribution of funds.
This game may result in a range of pooling and separating equilibria, however, since we clearly
see some communities that do not riot and some that do, I assume that we are in a separating
equilibrium. Additionally, I apply the intuitive criterion such that there only exists a single
separating equilibrium. In this equilibrium, as displayed in Figure 2.5, impoverished communities
choose R∗I = R1 and well-off communities choose R∗W = 0. The government then provdes a level of
G to each community type such that G(R∗I ) = θI and G(R∗W ) = θW .
This equilibrium, however, may be altered through the influence of pre-existing anti-poverty
funding to CAAs. In the Sowell inspired model, the presence of a CAA in a community is assumed
to decrease the value of kt by an amount equal to kW −kI . If we assume that only a small fraction of
well-off communities receive a CAA those well-off communities will choose a level of R equal to
that chosen by the impoverished communities resulting in a semi-pooled equilibrium. If we
consider the other extreme and introduce a CAA to all communities a separating equilibrium will
be maintained with R∗I = R2 and R∗W = 0 where R2 ≥ R1. There exist various intermediate cases,
some of which involve a 3-group separating equilibrium, but almost any version of such a model
will result in an increase in the number of riots in equilibrium.
It is also possible that CAAs alter the underlying type of a community through anti-poverty
programs, essentially transforming an impoverished community into a well-off community. This
decreases riots in a method that requires little explanation: as long as a separating equilibrium is
maintained (and it surely will be as the incentives to pooling for the impoverished type decreases),
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more communities choose not to riot.
The key takeaway from the model is that there are plausible scenarios under which the CAP
could have either increased or decreased rioting. It also shows that the CAP could decrease rioting
regardless of whether the root causes were economic or political. This model is easily extendable to
a multi-type or even a continuous type framework with very similar results. Also, it should be noted
that this is a community-level game, but it is reasonable to assume that an individual decision
process, similar to Glaeser and DiPasquale (1998), is underlying the model.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
In order to determine which factors are dominant, and hence the aggregate impact of the
Community Action Program on rioting, I conduct a four stage empirical analysis. First, I perform a
cross-sectional correlational analysis of riot severity or occurrence and spending. However, these
results are inconclusive and subject to a significant endogeneity problem. Second, I take advantage
of the time dimension of the data and conduct a panel analysis with a robust set of controls, fixed
effects, and time trends to further specify the treatment effect. However, this approach is subject to
endogeneity from time variant factors. Third, I attempt to resolve this endogeneity by determining
whether rioting responds to the initial funding of a CAA using an event study approach. However,
this approach only considers the extensive margin of treatment and has a pre-trend that is difficult to
eliminate. Thus, I return to the cross-sectional data and employ an instrumental variables strategy to
derive a causal estimate.31
2.4.1 Correlational Cross-Sectional Analysis
In this first stage of the empirical analysis, I use OLS to estimate the correlational relationship
between riot occurrence or severity and CAA spending in the cross-section.
Data
The data contain over 3000 counties and super-counties.32 For each county, I have a range of
economic and demographic covariates covering population, ethnicity, income, unemployment and
other variables. The full list of covariates are listed in the Appendix. These variables cover the
31The cross-sectional analysis is important valuable as, although timing data is available, there is no of when CAP
funds actually reach a community.
32The results are robust to limiting the sample to counties with populations over 25,000, populations under 500,000
or those with at least 1000 African Americans.
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range of covariates traditionally used in the sociological literature (Myers, 1997) that examines the
1960s riots. I also have detailed information for each county on the over 700 riots that occurred
across the United States from Collins and Margo (2007). I construct two principal dependent
variables using the riots data. The first measure is simply the number of riots that occurred in each
county between 1964-1971. The second measure is an index of severity. This index is equal to the
sum of the total share of arrests, deaths, injuries, and arson cases that occurred in each county from
1964-1971.33 As additional robustness tests, I include various absolute measures of intensity
including: the total number of days of rioting, the number of people killed, the number of people
injured, and the number of arson cases.34 The independent variables of interest (CAP spending and
CAP spending by program type) are created from the archival records of the Office of Economic
Opportunity. The CAP spending data cover the period 1965-1971 with a major gap in the data
occurring in 1969. As such, the primary analysis only includes CAP spending from 1965-1968. In
addition, I construct an indicator variable for the presence of a CAA in each county.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 plot the occurrence and severity of the rioting over the time period. The two
figures generally mirror each other, although there is significantly greater variation in riot intensity
early in the period and significantly less variance later in the period. Figure 2.3 plots severity by
killings, arson, arrests, and injuries and follows the same trends. Figure 2.4 plots the number of
riots that occurred in each city over the period. It is a common misconception that cities
experienced only a single riot. In fact, only 154 cities experienced a single riot. Cities large and
small experienced multiple cases of rioting. For example, Benton Harbor, Michigan witnessed 4
riots while Washington, DC experienced 17 riots.
Figure 2.6 plots the establishment of CAAs and the number of counties that had received
funding for at least one CAA. The figure shows that CAAs were initially funded in two waves in
1965 and 1966, with a handful of counties receiving funding for the first time in 1967 and 1968.
The distribution of CAP outlays by year are displayed in figure 2.7. As is clear in the figure, War on
Poverty outlays roll out slowly in 1965 ramping up to a peak in 1968.35 The initial disbursement of
outlays in 1965 was heavily targeted towards large cities with populations over 600,000. In 1966,
outlays shifted to a more even urban-rural divide with outlays to regions with fewer than 150,000
people roughly equaling outlays to regions with a population over 600,000. In general, most of the
CAA programs described in the Appendix ramped up along with overall CAA spending, although
health care spending rolled out somewhat more slowly than other programs.
33In other words, the index is equal to the number of arrests in city X divided by the number of arrests across all
cities, plus the number of deaths in city x divided by the total number of deaths across all cities and so forth.
34The results are also robust to the use of an absolute severity index, which is simply the sum of all severity
components in a county.
35Even at this peak, the War on Poverty accounts for only about 1% of the federal budget.
13
Methodology
For the baseline cross-sectional analysis, I employ a simple OLS regression framework. In general,
I include regional fixed effects and correct the standard errors for heteroskedasticity. These
regressions can be expressed as the following linear specification:
Ri = α+βOi + γXi + eit (2.1)
Where R represents the number of riots or the severity of rioting in county i, O is the per capita
value of CAA outlays to the county, and X is a vector of covariates, including state or regional
controls.
Results
In Part A of Table 2.3, I present results from the OLS regressions of the number of riots in a city on
total Community Action Agency outlays, an indicator for the presence of at least one CAA, and a
vector of socio-economic covariates. Part B of Table 2.3 presents similar results for the severity
index. These results are inconclusive. In general, CAA outlays per capita appear to be positively
correlated with riot occurrence and intensity, although the presence of a CAA is negatively
correlated with riot severity. It is also worth noting that the R2 values from the results, as it is clear
that the variables are much more effective at explaining the occurrence of rioting rather than the
actual severity of the riots.
Clearly, there are any number of sources of endogeneity biasing the results here. In particular,
the War on Poverty was targeted towards many African American communities that were highly
unequal in both income and segregationist attitudes, which could easily bias the results. In the
remaining 3 sections, I implement alternative approaches to better understand the true nature of this
relationship.
2.4.2 Panel Analysis
In order to further investigate the intensive margin of being treated by a CAA, I make use of the
imperfect timing data available for CAP outlays in an effort to take advantage of the rich temporal
variation in rioting and CAP spending in a fixed effects OLS analysis. Through county-specific
fixed effects, this approach eliminates time-invariant biases found in the OLS approach.
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Data
The panel analysis spans 1964-1968 and includes all of the 3000 plus counties present in the
cross-sectional analysis. Time periods are divided by year, although the results from the analysis
are robust to a monthly analysis. While the riots data includes the exact date of riot occurrence, the
CAA outlays data do not have the same degree of precision. The only date available for the outlays
is the signing date of each individual outlay; there is no information available as to when those
funds are spent on a particular program. As a result, I use this date as if it is the actual date at which
the money was spent and, it is for this reason, that I have chosen to present annual rather than
monthly results. This is also important as results may occur with a lag.
Methodology
I consider two sets of panel specifications for the analysis. In the primary panel regression, I regress
riot occurrence or severity CAA outlays provided in the current year in an annual panel. The
specification for this OLS regression is:
Rit = αi +βOit + γu(i)t +δu(i)t +piXit +ΠPRit + εit (2.2)
Where Rit is the number of riots in county i in year t, αi is a set of county fixed effects that
accounts for time-invariant facts and constant unobservable factors, Oit are CAP outlays provided
to county i in year t, γu( j)t is a set of urban status-by-year fixed effects, δu(i)t is a set of year or
state-by-year fixed effects that captures national trends in funding, Xit is a set of county
demographics interacted with a linear time trend, PRit is a set of covariates measuring past rioting
in county i, and εit is an error term.
In second set of panel specifications, Oit is replaced with the sum of CAA outlays provided to
county i prior to year t. I repeat these specifications with outlays divided by CAA program type.
Results
The results from the panel specifications of outlays provided in year t are presented in Table 2.4.
The results indicate that there is a strong, negative relationship between CAA outlays provided in
year t and both riot occurrence and severity. The treatment effect is statistically and economically
significant, indicating that over the entire period, CAA outlays decreased the number of riots by
4-6% and the intensity of rioting by approximately 50%.
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This is likely an underestimate of the aggregate impact of CAA outlays, as there may be an
ongoing impact of previously spent outlays. The results from the second set of panel specifications
in Table 2.5 account for these impacts. The results are again economically and statistically
significant and the treatment effects are even larger. For a sense of scale, the results indicate that the
total CAA outlays decreased the number of riots by roughly 15% and the severity of rioting by
nearly 50%.
I present a similar analysis with outlays divided by expenditure type in Table 2.6. The most
striking element amongst the results is the strong negative relationship between community
organizing and riot severity given contemporary claims that organizing promoted rioting. The
single largest negative treatment effect is legal outlays, which is consistent with rioting being driven
by the failure of communities to provide proper redress in disputes with the police. Not surprisingly,
employment programs were highly effective at discouraging rioting, although it is unclear if the
cause is that people are unable to riot while working or that a better life discourages destructive
activity.
The panel results are robust to including years post-1968, limiting counties to those with
populations over 25,000, 50,000 and 100,000, and limiting counties to African American
populations over 1,000 or 5,000. Although these results are robust, it remains possible that there
may be an unobservable covariate that varies with the error term so, in the final empirical section I
seek to address this concern.
2.4.3 Event Study Analysis: Does Riot Occurrence Change after a County
Receives its First CAA?
To gather further evidence regarding the relationship between the Community Action Program, I
employ an event study analysis in an effort to take advantage of the variable timing with which
CAAs were first funded. This approach is attractive as if properly implemented it should deal with
the endogeneity approach in the prior section.
Methodology
To determine whether the propensity to riot changed following the introduction of a CAA to a
community, I employ an event study framework with robust controls based on the following
specification:
Rit = αi + γu(i)t +δu(i)t +Σ−1−3piyDi1(t−T ∗i = y)+Σ31τyDi1(t−T ∗i = y)+ εit (2.3)
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Where Rit is the number of riots in county i in year t, αi is a set of county fixed effects that
accounts for time-invariant facts and constant unobservable factors, γu( j)t is a set of urban
status-by-year fixed effects, δu(i)t is a set of year or state-by-year fixed effects that captures national
trends in funding, and εit is an error term. Di is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a county
ever receives a CAA and captures the treatment of having a CAA. The effect of having a CAA on
rioting is captured with a series of event-year dummies 1(t−T ∗i = y), which are equal to 1 in the
relevant event year.
Results
The results are presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.7. They indicate that a county was somewhat more
likely to experience a riot prior to the initial funding of a CAA in a county and significantly less
likely after the funding of the CAA. The scale of the treatment effect is quite large, decreasing the
average number of riots in a year by between 58 and 450, depending on the estimate.
A. Dependent Variable: Number of Riots
Year: -3 0.129∗∗∗ 0.0610∗
[0.0374 [0.0351]
Year: -2 0.153∗∗∗ -0.0669∗∗∗
[0.0228] [0.0217]
Year: -1 0.0620∗∗∗ 0.0199
[0.0166] [0.0158]
Year: 1 -0.0633∗∗∗ -0.0332∗∗
[0.0143] [0.0137]
Year: 2 -0.0544∗∗∗ -0.0417∗∗∗
[0.0160] [0.0153]
Year: 3 0.090∗∗∗ 0.0207
[0.0147] [0.0141]
Obs 10718 10718
R2 0.50 0.56
Covariates C, S-Y C, S-Y, U-Y
Table 2.1 Event Study Relationship Between a City’s First CAA Grant and Riot. Note: The models
presented are least-squares estimates of equation 5 using event study year groupings. C represents county
fixed effects; S-Y represents state by year fixed effects; U-Y represents urban by year fixed effects. More
information is available in the note attached to Figure 5. Sources: Spilerman, 1971, Carter, 1986, NACAP,
County and City Data Book
These results are robust to additional controls and a variety of specifications and are displayed
visually in Figure 2.8. Importantly, although there is evidence that CAA funding responds to
rioting, the timing of a county receiving its first CAA grant is unrelated to rioting in 1964 and
1965.36 However, it is impossible to completely eliminate the pre-trend in this analysis, meaning
that we cannot be certain of causation. In addition, these results are limited to the extensive margin
of the treatment.
36A companion paper is currently in progress that focuses entirely on whether the allocation of War on Poverty
funding responded to rioting. Preliminary results from this analysis indicate that there is a meaningful increase in
funding in response to both the occurrence and the relative severity of a riot.
17
2.4.4 Instrumental Variables Cross-Sectional Analysis
In the final stage of the empirical analysis, I return to the cross-section and implement an
instrumental variables approach to achieve causal identification of the impact of CAA funding on
riot occurrence and severity. This is necessary given the complications found in the prior three
approaches.
Methodology
In order to accurately estimate the treatment effect of CAP outlays in the cross-section, I employ an
instrumental variables strategy to isolate exogenous variation in the level of federal support for
CAAs. I instrument for the level of CAP outlays with two instrumental variables: the change in the
share of voters supporting the Democratic presidential candidate between 1960 and 1964 interacted
with a measure of whether the 1960 presidential election in the state was close and a similar,
weighted measure for Democratic senators and the number of close senate races in the state
between 1960 and 1964.
These instruments are driven by the understanding that while primarily concentrated on
alleviating poverty, Johnson’s War on Poverty may have had a secondary political component as
captured by Bailey and Duquette (2014). In particular, while the War on Poverty was designed to
end poverty in America, it was also designed to shift the electoral balance in the United States
(Brauer, 1982). If targeted funding increased the popularity of the Democratic Party they would
choose to direct these funds to regions to that could be part of a broader, structural shift in
Democratic support. This is consistent with findings from the political economy literature around
pork barrel spending. For example, Levitt and Snyder (1997) find that federal government spending
has a significant impact on the re-election prospects of incumbents. In addition, there is evidence
(Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2005) that spending on welfare programs can significantly boost
electoral turnout. As such, there is strong reason to believe that the Democratic Party may have
distributed Community Action Program dollars to maximize its political gains. So where would the
government choose to target these outlays? Since the 1964 vote was a landslide, regions of
significant growth in Democratic vote share signaled opportunities for Democrats to gain long-term
support. In order to help secure the votes of citizens in these newly Democratic regions, the
Democrats may have chosen to disproportionately allocate Community Action Program spending to
these regions. This would be make sense from a traditional “pork barrel politics” frame, but also
from the perspective of CAAs being entities that engaged in political organizing.
Using these instruments, I perform a two-stage least squares analysis. The first step is to
perform a regression of:
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Oi = δ0 +δ1Pi +δ2Si +λXi + vi (2.4)
Where Oi is the per capita value of CAA outlays designated county i, Pi is the change in the
share of voters in county i supporting a Democratic presidential candidate interacted with whether a
state was close, Si is the change in the share of voters in county i supporting a Democratic
senatorial candidate interacted with the number of close senate races, Xi is a vector of county
specific covariates, and vi is an error term. I calculate a predicted value for the level of outlays per
capita, which I then employ in the second stage of the regression:
Ri = α+β Oˆi + γXi + ei (2.5)
Data
Aside from the information necessary to derive the instrumental variables, the data is otherwise
identical to that from the previous cross-sectional work. The data used to construct the instrumental
variables are drawn from the “General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990” (ICPSR,
1984) dataset and the United States Congressional District Data Books (ICPSR, 1973).
I employ two measures generated from these data. The first instrument is the change in the
share of voters in a county that voted Democrat in the presidential elections between 1960 and 1964
interacted with whether the state was a close race in the 1960 presidential election. A close race is
defined to be a margin of less than 10 percentage points.
The second instrument is the change in the share of voters supporting a Democratic senator
interacted with the total number of senate races in the state that were close in 1960, 1962, and 1964.
As a result of the staggered senatorial election cycle, I generate the change in Democratic support
as a weighted measure of the 1958-1960 period versus the 1964-1966 period.
Instrument Validity
There is little reason to doubt the instruments’ relevance, as the F-statistic against the null that the
excluded instruments are irrelevant in the first stage is 12 or greater, indicating that the results are
robust to a weak instruments criticism. This is unsurprising given the strong relationship between
the change in presidential vote share and CAP funding found in Bailey and Duquette (2014).
Furthermore, the importance of the IV approach is supported by the Wu-Hausman test, which has a
p-value of 0.0043, indicating that CAA outlays are not exogenous.
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With respect to the validity of the instruments, there is a literature on riots and elections that
suggests that one should worry about the exogeneity of the instruments and the external validity of
the results. In particular, there are a number of studies37 considering the relationship between
violence and elections in India. These studies tend to show that elections themselves encourage
rioting and other violence.38 In theory, competing parties may have some control over their
supporters, allowing them to instigate mob violence for political purposes, resulting in political
polarization. It appears, however, that riots in developing nations are different phenomenons than
their American counterparts. Indian riots are generally “preplanned and well organized and are not
instantaneous” (Vadlamannati, 2008), which is the opposite characterization of American riots
(Sears and McConahay, 1973). Rather, the proximate cause of American riots is typically
interaction with the police. Additionally, there is no evidence that the 1960s American riots were
orchestrated by political parties while Brass (2003) shows that Indian riots are often driven directly
by political parties. There is also a clear seasonality to American riots, which typically occur during
the summer months. As such, they do not occur close to election dates. Empirical testing finds no
evidence that the 1960s race riots are similarly driven by an electoral cycle.
There is no strong reason to believe that rioting would be related to Democratic efforts to
expand their voting base other than through the potential for regional patronage. However, it is
possible that regions with shifting political allegiances in the first half of the 1960s may have been
coincidentally more or less likely to experience rioting as a result of other factors. Comparing
counties above and below the average values of the instrumental variables reveal that, on average,
they are similar. Counties that experienced an above average increase in support for Senate
Democrats tended to be somewhat smaller, but with more African American and somewhat fewer
immigrants. In order to correct for this, I include a robust set of controls surrounding population,
ethnicity, and population density as detailed in the Appendix.39
Over-identification tests for the instrumental variable specifications result in a p-value of
between 0.3 to 0.4, indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are
exogenous. To further test the exogeniety of the instruments, I run the first stage of the IV
regressions with several outcomes other than government spending as the dependent variable.
These outcomes include: city expenditures in 1964, city welfare spending in 1964, average rainfall,
average temperature, form of municipal government, and infant mortality in 1950. In all of these
37Gareth Nellis and Rosenzweig (2014), Chaturvedi and Mukherji (2005), and Wilkinson (2004) have all studied the
relationship between rioting and elections.
38A study by Vadlamannati (2008) considers the relationship between the timing of elections and the occurrence of
riots over 16 Indian states from 1958-2004. Vadlamannati’s results indicate that scheduled elections are related to an
increase in riots and that more riots occur as one approaches an election year and decreases after the elections, resulting
in a cyclical riot pattern.
39A complete comparison of counties above and below the mean of the instrumental variables is presented in the
Appendix.
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cases the instruments hold no explanatory power.
Results
The results from the instrumental variables regressions are presented in Table 2.2. They differ
significantly from the basic cross-sectional analysis.
A. Dependent Variable: Number of Riots
First Stage Second Stage
CAA Outlays -0.68∗∗
[0.28]
∆ Dem. Pres. Vote Share 60−64 0.38∗
[0.20]
∆ Dem. Sen. Vote Share 60−64 1.07∗∗∗
[0.23]
Observations 3069 3069
R2 0.066 0.51
B. Dependent Variable: Severity of Riots
First Stage Second Stage
CAA Outlays -0.0042
[0.003]
∆ Dem. Pres. Vote Share 60−64 0.38∗
[0.20]
∆ Dem. Sen. Vote Share 60−64 1.07∗∗∗
[0.23]
Observations 3069 3069
R2 0.066 0.59
Covariates D, R D, R
Table 2.2 Elections Instrumental Variable: Does Funding Stop Rioting? (2SLS). Note: The models pre-
sented are two-stage least-squares estimates of equations 2 and 3. D represents a robust set of demographic
controls, which are fully listed in the data appendix; R represents regional controls. If a two-step Tobit
procedure is used for severity of riots regression, CAA outlays are found to be statistically significant with a
coefficient of −.09 and a standard error of 0.05. Sources: Spilerman, 1971, Carter, 1986, NACAP, County
and City Data Book
The estimates indicate that CAP outlays significantly decreased rioting and, although the
severity index is not statistically significant, it is on the verge of significance.40 To get a sense of the
magnitude of the treatment effect, a one standard deviation change in CAP outlays per person ($78
per person) would decrease the number of riots in a city by 0.53 and the severity of rioting by
0.0042. In order to achieve a one standard deviation decline in the number of riots (1.386 riots),
outlays per person would need to increase by $204. A $438 per person increase would be required
to achieve a single standard deviation increase in riot severity (0.0184). 41
40However, when implementing the two-stage Tobit procedure, accounting for the lower bound at 0, CAA outlays
are found to significantly decrease riot severity.
41These results are robust to a number of tests, including: removing counties with a population under 50,000,
removing the largest city in each state, restricting outlays to those pre-1968 and riots post 1967, and controlling for
industrial composition, city welfare spending, total city spending, the form of municipal government and rainfall.
For example, dropping counties with a population under 50,000 in population still results in a statistically significant
treatment effect with a standard deviation increase in outlays decreasing the number of riots in a city by 0.41. The
results are also robust to alternative closeness thresholds between 10% and 1%. For example, with a 1% threshold the
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2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
The results from the empirical analysis suggest that funding for the Community Action Program
decreased both the occurrence and the severity of the 1960s race riots. The results vindicate Lyndon
Johnson’s use of the Community Action Program to deter the riots. Although the results do not
allow us to rule out individual incidents in which CAA staff were involved in rioting, they allow us
to reject any overarching narrative suggesting that the War on Poverty or the CAP was a driving
force behind the race riots. Furthermore, the results suggest that the War on Poverty was not as
ineffective as some commentators (Ginzberg and Solow, 1974) have suggested and add to a
growing literature suggesting that the War on Poverty was, at the very least, a limited success
(Almond et al., 2011; Bailey, 2012; Bailey and Danzinger, 2013; Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2009;
Ludwig and Miller, 2007).
It is important to consider the relative magnitude of this effect. The estimates suggest an
approximate reduction in riot occurrence of 15 to 60 percent and reduction in severity of 45 to 54
percent. Given the billions of dollars spent in the War on Poverty, at first glance, this does not
appear to be an overwhelming effect. However, the attempt to discourage the race riots was a
secondary goal of the Community Action Program and funds were not allocated to programs in a
manner that would have maximized riot reduction. This is particularly clear when considering the
“cost” to prevent a riot in a particular city; for example, the results suggest that it would have taken a
several-fold increase in the size of Detroit’s CAP program to prevent the Detroit riots. However,
this could nearly be achieved through the reallocation of existing spending to community
organizing and legal support.
We may also draw conclusions about the impact of community action on the welfare of African
Americans. Economists tend to use variables such as wealth, income, consumption or measures of
happiness as proxies for human welfare. The occurrence of riots should make a suitable addition to
this list of proxies for human welfare, as nearly all theories intended to explain the 1960s riots rest
upon some form of displeasure or disenfranchisement in the African American community. As
such, we may view the differential occurrence of riots as a cross-city measure of welfare. Thus, the
causal negative relationship between CAA spending and riot occurrence indicates that the
Community Action Program improved the quality of life for those living in poor African American
communities.
It is of particular interest that, in the analysis by spending type, it is not the funds dedicated
towards the provision of direct anti-poverty services that appear to make the largest difference.
Rather, it is the spending on community organizing and legal support by CAAs that appear to have
treatment effect of outlays on rioting is -0.26∗∗.
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driven the decrease in rioting42. This result speaks to the internal debate that raged within the CAA
movement regarding the relative importance of organizing and service provision and indicates that
Shriver’s push towards service-oriented CAAs may not have been the optimal policy to prevent
rioting. While the results indicate that empowerment was the essential factor, it is difficult to be
certain of the precise mechanism. For example, it is possible that the outlays provided for
community organizing are proxying for the inclusiveness or democratic nature of the CAA. It seems
likely that community organized CAAs, rather than institutionally supported CAAs, would be
applying for these community organizing grants. In addition to being democratic, it is likely many
of these same CAAs carried on the non-violent tradition of the civil rights movement, pushing for
political equality with federal funds, which may have discouraged rioting as a valid form of protest
(Andrews, 2001; Quadagno, 1994).43 This view is supported by Sirianni and Friedland (1995) who
argue that CAAs “appear to have often been captured by the civil rights movement and caught up in
the dynamics of political struggle.” If it was indeed the traditional leaders of the civil rights
movement taking control this struggle would likely have been a non-violent one. Regardless, the
results indicate that community empowerment was the active mechanism through which the CAP
lessened rioting. This is a clear rejection of the argument that CAAs encouraged rioting through
their anti-establishment organizing. Additionally, this finding supports those sociological theories
in which communal violence is driven by disenfranchisement or frustration.
While riots are a relatively rare phenomenon in the United States, many nations, particularly
developing ones, are faced by regular rioting and other forms of communal violence. Many papers
have focused on the relationship between declining income and communal violence (Bohlken and
Sergenti, 2010; Miguel, 2005; Muller, 2008); these results suggest that, while anti-poverty
programs may be effective in discouraging this violence, it is important that attempts be made to
empower the poor to make these programs as effective as possible.
To conclude, the analysis presented in this article shows that spending on the Community
Action Program during the War on Poverty served to ease the rioting in the 1960s. In particular,
there is no empirical support for claims that the Community Action Program served to encourage
these riots. While there are certainly elements of the CAP that can be criticized, the CAPs
discouragement of the race riots should be considered one of its great successes.
42The success of employment services in decreasing riot severity is a significant outlier from this larger point.
43However, there are accounts of “black militants” running some of community-controlled CAAs, which may have
accessed community organizing funds (Flanagan, 1998).
23
2.6 Appendix
Number of Riots and Days of Rioting by Month, 1964-1971
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Figure 2.1 A riot is defined as a spontaneous event with at least 30 participants that resulted in some type
of damage or violent behaviour. In addition, the data from Spilerman and Carter requires that some of the
participants must be of African American origin. Many riots extended over several days, particularly during
the major outbreaks of rioting in 1967 and 1968 Source: Spilerman, 1971 and Carter, 1986.
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Riot Severity by Month, 1964-1971
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Figure 2.2 Riot severity is defined as the share of each of each riot characteristic that occurred in the time
period, meaning that the total value sums to 5. The trends generally mirror the prior figure. Obvious points of
difference include the outbreak of rioting in late 1965, which was particularly severe along with the surge of
rioting in the spring of 1967. Source: Spilerman, 1971 and Carter, 1986.
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Other Outcomes by Month, 1964-1971
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Figure 2.3 Individual rioting characteristics generally match the prior trends. While injuries and arrests
closely mirror the number of riots graph, deaths and arson cases appear to drive the differences between riot
occurrence and riot severity. Source: Spilerman, 1971 and Carter, 1986.
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Number of Riots per City, 1964-1971
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Figure 2.4 A riot is defined as in previous tables. Source: Spilerman, 1971 and Carter, 1986.
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Indifference Curves for Impoverished and Well-off Communities in a Signaling Model
Figure 2.5 Indifference curves for impoverished and well-off communities in a signaling model.
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Establishment of CAAs, 1965-1971
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Figure 2.6 Dates are the first month that CAP funding was provided to a city. It is assumed that a CAA
exists in a city once the first outlay to the city is recorded. The vast majority of counties receive their first
funding allocation in 1966, although several hundred counties also received their first allocation in 1965.
Source: NACAP.
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Funding for CAAs, 1965-1971
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
O
ut
la
ys
 in
 M
illi
on
s 
of
 D
ol
la
rs
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Community Action Program Funding
Figure 2.7 This figure displays told CAP outlays allocated to a county. They are assigned to years based
on the signing date of the financial allocation. Unfortunately, the NACAP data are missing grants for 1969 so
that year is excluded. Source: NACAP.
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Rioting in Relation to a County’s First CAA
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Figure 2.8 This figure visually displays the results from Table 6. Model 1 includes county, and state-year
fixed effects. Model 2 includes county, state-year, and urban-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are
reported. Time 0 indicates funds that were provided in the actual year that a county first received CAA
funding. Points to the left indicate the number of riots in the years prior to the funding of the CAA and points
to the right indicate outlays provided in the years after the CAA was established. Sources: Spilerman, 1971,
Carter, 1986 and NACAP.
31
Relationship Between CAP Outlays and Rioting (OLS)
A. Dependent Variable: Number of Riots
CAA 0.00 0.018 0.080∗ 0.13∗∗∗
[0.054] [0.052] [0.042] [0.038]
CAA Outlays 3.9 3.6 1.7 -6.6∗∗
[3.0] [2.9] [10.0] [3.1]
Observations 3069 3069 3069 3069
R2 0.64 0.64 0.48 0.73
Covariates D D, R D D, R
Time period All All B-A B-A
B. Dependent Variable: Severity of Riots
CAA -0.0018 -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.00040
[0.0013] [0.0012] [0.0020] [0.00079]
CAA Outlays 0.12 0.11 0.53 -0.045
[0.091] [0.088] [0.53] [0.055]
Observations 3069 3069 3069 3069
R2 0.47 0.47 0.33 0.33
Covariates D D, R D D, R
Time period All All B-A B-A
Table 2.3 The models presented are least-squares estimates of equation 1. The primary independent
variables are CAA outlays per capita provided to a county in the current year and whether a county has a
funded CAA. D represents a robust set of demographic controls, which are fully listed in the data appendix;
R represents regional controls. The “All” time period spans all CAA funding and riots between 1964 and
1971; the “B-A” time period includes outlays prior to 1967 and riots post 1967. Sources: Spilerman, 1971,
Carter, 1986, NACAP, County and City Data Book.
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Relationship Between Year-of CAP Outlays and Rioting (Panel OLS)
A. Dependent Variable: Number of Riots
CAA Outlays -1.98∗∗∗ -1.80∗∗∗ -1.15∗∗
[0.515] [0.508] [0.509]
Obs 15935 15935 15935
R2 0.65 0.66 0.68
Covariates C, Y-ST, Y-U, D-T C, Y-ST, Y-U, D-T, P-R C, Y-ST, Y-U, D-T, P-R, E-T
B. Dependent Variable: Severity of Riots
CAA Outlays -0.276∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗∗
[0.0145] [0.0145] [0.0148]
Obs 15935 15935 15935 5
R2 0.43 0.43 0.43
Covariates C, Y-ST, Y-U, D-T C, Y-ST, Y-U, D-T, P-R C, Y-ST, Y-U, D-T, P-R, E-T
Table 2.4 The models presented are least-squares estimates of equation 6. The primary independent variable
is total value of outlays (in millions of dollars) provided to a county in the current year. C represents county
fixed effects; S-Y represents state by year fixed effects; U-Y represents urban by year fixed effects; D-T
represents basic demographics interacted with a time trend; P-R represents controls related to the occurrence
of past rioting; E-T represents expanded demographics interacted with a time trend. Sources: Spilerman,
1971, Carter, 1986, NACAP, County and City Data Book.
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Relationship Between Cumulative CAP Outlays and Rioting (Panel OLS)
A. Dependent Variable: Number of Riots
CAA Outlays -2.76∗∗∗ -2.80∗∗∗ -2.62∗∗
[0.215] [0.214] [0.219]
Obs 15935 15935 15935
R2 0.66 0.67 0.68
Covariates C, Y-ST, Y-U, D-T C, Y-ST, Y-U, D-T, P-R C, Y-ST, Y-U, D-T, P-R, E-T
B. Dependent Variable: Severity of Riots
CAA Outlays -0.117∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗
[0.0061] [0.0061] [0.0064]
Obs 15935 15935 15935
R2 0.43 0.43 0.43
Covariates C, Y-ST, Y-U, D-T C, Y-ST, Y-U, D-T, P-R C, Y-ST, Y-U, D-T, P-R, E-T
Table 2.5 The models presented are least-squares estimates of equation 7. The primary independent variable
is total value of outlays (in millions of dollars) provided to a county in all years prior to the current year. C
represents county fixed effects; S-Y represents state by year fixed effects; U-Y represents urban by year fixed
effects; D-T represents basic demographics interacted with a time trend; P-R represents controls related to
the occurrence of past rioting; E-T represents expanded demographics interacted with a time trend. Sources:
Spilerman, 1971, Carter, 1986, NACAP, County and City Data Book.
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Relationship Between Types of CAP Outlays and Riot Severity
Dependent Variable: Severity of Riots
Health Outlays 2.29∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗
[0.301] [0.243]
CAA. Admin Outlays 0.462∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗
[0.00112] [0.000774]
Youth Outlays 1.9∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗
[0.229] [0.1881]
Legal Outlays -5.52∗∗∗ -2.46∗∗∗
[0.203] [0.164]
Comm. Org. Outlays -1.01∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗∗
[0.085] [0.0536]
Child Care Outlays 0.917∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗
[0.867] [0.0710]
Employment Outlays -1.68∗∗∗ -1.38∗∗∗
[0.147] [0.0818]
Obs 15935 15935
R2 0.46 0.49
Outlays Year-of Cumulative
Covariates C, Y-ST, Y-U, P-R C, Y-ST, Y-U, P-R
Table 2.6 The models presented are least-squares estimates of equations 7 and 8. The primary independent
variables are the total value of outlays (in millions of dollars) assigned to different program types and provided
to a county. C represents county fixed effects; S-Y represents state by year fixed effects; U-Y represents
urban by year fixed effects; D-T represents basic demographics interacted with a time trend; P-R represents
controls related to the occurrence of past rioting; E-T represents expanded demographics interacted with a
time trend. Sources: Spilerman, 1971, Carter, 1986, NACAP, County and City Data Book.
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Event Study: Relationship Between a City’s First CAA Grant and Riot Occurrence
A. Dependent Variable: Number of Riots
Pre-riot 0.107∗∗∗ 0.0452∗∗∗
[0.0182] [0.177]
Post-riot -0.415∗∗ -0.0210
[0.0181] [0.0172]
Obs 10718 10718
R2 0.49 0.56
Covariates C, S-Y C, S-Y, U-Y
Table 2.7 The models presented are least-squares estimates of equation 5 using event study year groupings.
C represents county fixed effects; S-Y represents state by year fixed effects; U-Y represents urban by year
fixed effects. More information is available in the note attached to Figure 5. Sources: Spilerman, 1971, Carter,
1986, NACAP, County and City Data Book.
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Characteristics of Cities Receiving CAAs, 1964-1971
CAA Established in Estimation Sample
1965 1966 1967 1968 CAA No CAA
(N=373) (N=1089) (N=56) (N=34) (N=1522) (N=1635)
Mean 1960 Population (thousands) 232.4 52.2 35.6 26.9 94.4 20.0
Mean 1960 Population in Poverty (thousands) 29.6 8.3 7.1 6.7 13.4 3.9
Percentage of 1960 Population
African American 8.8 10.9 10.7 17.6 10.5 8.7
Foreign Born 3.6 2.0 1.8 1.1 2.4 1.7
In Poverty 14.2 17.5 16.2 24.0 16.8 17.3
Income below $3000 26.9 35.4 33.2 43.0 33.5 35.6
Unemployed 5.8 5.5 5.2 5.8 5.6 4.7
Median
Income (thousands) 5.0 4.2 4.3 3.6 4.4 3.8
African American Income (thousands) 4.4 3.1 2.6 2.1 3.4 1.5
Percentage African American Population Change 18.3 6.3 19.0 1.4 8.9 2.1
Table 2.8 This table includes unweighted summary statistics for a total of 3157 counties. Sources: NACAP
and County and City Data Book. The complete list of socioeconomic control variables is as follows: pop-
ulation in 1960, percentage of population in an urban centre in 1960, percentage of the population that
was African American in 1960, percentage of the population that was foreign born in 1960, median age in
1960, median years of schooling in 1960, percentage of civilian workers unemployed in 1960, percentage of
workers using public transit in 1960, percentage of families making less than $3000 in 1960, median family
income of whites in 1969, median family income of African Americans in 1969, percentage of families in
poverty in 1969, number of citizens on public assistance in 1964, and percentage of African Americans who
owned their own home in 1970.
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Characteristics of Cities by Riot Occurrence, 1964-1971
At Least One Riot No Riots
(N=241) (N=2904)
Mean 1960 Population (thousands) 412.4 29;7
Mean 1960 Population in Poverty (thousands) 40.3 85.2
Percentage of 1960 Population
African American 16.6 9.0
Foreign Born 4.0 1.8
In Poverty 11.7 17.5
Income below $3000 22.5 35.7
Unemployed 5.1 5.2
Median
Income (thousands) 5.5 3.9
African American Income (thousands) 6.3 2.1
Percentage African American Population Change 29.9 3.1
Table 2.9 This table includes unweighted summary statistics for a total of 3157 counties. Sources: NACAP
and County and City Data Book.
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Summary of Major Riots
Year Month City Arrests Injured Killed Days Severity Trigger
1965 August Los Angeles 3952 1032 34 7 4.9 Started with an arrest for
impaired driving
1967 July Detroit 7231 491 43 9 4.9 Started with a police raid
on a blind pig
1968 April Washington 7772 1158 11 9 4.6 Grew out of a march led
by Stokely Carmichael af-
ter the death of Dr Mar-
tin Luther King Jr (Zeman,
2011)
1967 July Newark 1443 1108 24 6 4.1 Started after the police
were seen taking an inca-
pacitated cab driver into a
precinct, leading to a ru-
mor that he had been killed
(Parks, 2007)
1968 April Baltimore 5682 900 6 6 3.8 Broke out of 2 days of
mild unrest after the death
of Dr King
1968 April Chicago 3026 501 9 7 3.8 Rioting broke out on the
West side of Chicago af-
ter the assassination of Dr
King. Investigations failed
to determine a particular
cause beyond pent-up ag-
gressions (Chicago Riot
Study Committee, 1968)
1967 July Milwaukee 1183 100 4 10 3.3 Started with the police in-
tervening in a fight at the
St. Francis Community
Centre (Unknown, 2007)
1966 July Cleveland 3253 60 4 5 3.3 Started when police ar-
rived to control protests
outside of an openly dis-
criminatory bar (Michney,
2006)
Table 2.10 This table summarizes the most damaging of the 1960s race riots, as measured by the factor
severity index developed by (Collins and Margo, 2007). Sources: Spilerman, 1971 and Carter, 1986.
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Chapter 3
War Contracts and Break Points: The
Economic Geography of American Trade
Unions
3.1 Introduction
The study of the trade union movement has found new life over the last decade with the
introduction of causal methodology. In that time, economists have developed a thorough
understanding of the impact of unions on wages and firm performance,1 inequality,2, poverty,3
unemployment and a host of other outcomes. However, economists and other social scientists have
been slow to apply contemporary methodology to the study of union membership and its spatial
distribution.4 And while there have been attempts to analyze the spatial growth of union
membership in other disciplines, there are clear advantages to bringing both the insights and the
empirical rigour of economics to the topic. 5
The goal of this paper is to develop an economic understanding of the basic spatial processes
that underlay the American labour movement. To this end, I look to the field of economic
geography for guidance. In particular, this paper treats the city growth and disaster response
literature6 as a template for conducting this analysis both with respect to the possible growth
processes and obtaining causation in the analysis. As urban economists have attempted to explain
“the distribution of economic activity across space”(Davis and Weinstein, 2001) by searching for
1Recent examples include Lee and Mas (2012,) and DiNardo and Lee (2004).
2For examples, refer to the work of Card et al. (2004) and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2012).
3Brady et al. (2013) find that state-level unionization is a key determinant of working poverty levels in the United
States
4There are only a handful of notable exceptions to this observation in the last 20 years. These include Freeman
(1998), Palley and LaJeunesse (2007), and Holmes (2006).
5This is not to undermine the importance and substantial work performed by dozens of economic geographers study-
ing the spatiality of labour. I provide a thorough review of the relevant literature produced by economic geographers
later in the paper.
6A particular intellectual debt is owed to both Vigdor (2009) and Davis and Weinstein (2001).
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regional persistence and spillover effects; I search for the effects that may govern the distribution of
union membership.
The three principal approaches for explaining the spatial distribution of economic activity as
identified by Davis and Weinstein (2001) can be re-purposed to apply to the spatial distribution of
union membership: increasing returns, locational fundamentals, and random growth. Union density
could be governed by regional increasing returns for a variety of reasons: decreasing costs for
organizing drives,7 increasing costs for employers that fight union drives,8 and decreasing costs of
unionization to employers.9 There could also be some form of political lock-in mechanism that
would result in increasing returns.10 The locational fundamentals hypothesis most closely mirrors
the conventional wisdom regarding the growth of unions. Union growth that is a result of the
presence of certain industries, cultural beliefs, or exogenous institutions all fall within this umbrella.
The random growth hypothesis suggests that the distribution of union membership develops
according to a basic stochastic process. The key question from a public policy perspective is: how
important increasing returns to scale have been for the labour movement? Given the significant
contraction of the US labour movement over the last 50 years, this question is fundamental to
whether labour has the ability to halt this decline.
This paper examines these growth dynamics using state-level union membership or imputed
membership dating back to the late 1930s and a quasi-natural experiment that occurred during
World War II.
First, I assemble dataset of all available state-level union membership figures running back to
the 1930s11 and search for patterns in the data. This exercise reveals that, in recent decades, the
labour movement has become concentrated in fewer and fewer states, which is indicative of an
increasing returns phenomenon. These data point to the fact that the labour movement underwent a
significant spatial reorganization or “break point” during World War II12 that can be exploited for
causal analysis.
Second, I exploit the break point during World War II as a quasi-natural experiment to causally
determine the role of increasing returns in unions’ spatial growth. In particular, I take advantage of
7For example, this may include: knowledge spillovers, the presence of local volunteers to organize and support job
actions, and local union infrastructure.
8Costs on the employer side include: picket lines that are better respected by suppliers, regional product boycotts,
and political pressure.
9If local wages are already increased through threat affects or wage matching within the industry (Freeman, 1986)
there may be little disadvantage to allowing the union to enter the workplace.
10The primary example here would be the exceptional degree of control that the United Auto Workers have held over
the Democratic Party in the state of Michigan.
11This dataset can be extended back as far as the 1870s. However, in such a case it will contain many data gaps in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
12Prior spatial reorganizations likely occurred with the collapse of the Knights of Labor after the Haymarket Massacre
and during World War I.
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the World War II era labour-government compact, which made employer-resistance to union drives
difficult in key war industries. The compact was broadly ignored, although it was almost uniformly
complied with in “essential” wartime industries: firms that refused to obey directive orders from the
NWLB, particularly in the case of union recognition and security, were seized by the military
(Teller, 1947). This institutional feature suggests that regions that included a large number of
important war industries in the early 1940s should have witnessed significantly lower organizing
costs for the AFL and the CIO, resulting in an increase in organizing, and thus, union density. The
compact is an ideal quasi-experiment, as it only lasted for a handful of years, was associated with
the largest expansion in union organizing in American history, and can be differentiated by region
using information on the assignment of war contracts. Using war contracts as an instrumental
variable, the results from this quasi-experiment show that increasing returns play an important role
in the growth of unions, as unions that experienced this exogenous boost to membership during
World War II have seen the greatest private and public sector union membership growth since.
Third, I attempt isolate the causes of the increasing returns phenomenon. I employ data from
the AFL-CIO FAST Database, covering all union organizing drives from 1960 until the early 2000s,
to determine whether more organizing occurs in regions with high union density. The results
indicate that the vast majority of union organizing has occurred in regions that experienced the
greatest union growth during World War II. Using this same dataset, I also find that firms are much
less resistant to existing unions and organizing drives in high-density regions, as measured by the
number of unfair labour practice filings. While right-to-work legislation appears to play some role
in the increasing returns phenomenon, other types of state-level labor regulations do not appear to
play an important role. These mechanisms clarify how the increasing returns phenomenon
identified previously operates. Furthermore, it clarifies that some of the key locational fundamentals
such as “right-to-work” legislation and employer culture are in fact endogenous to membership.
The results indicate that the growth of the American labour movement is subject to a powerful
increasing returns phenomenon. This is an important development in our understanding of the
processes governing union growth and is a break with the conventional wisdom that culture, legal
institutions, and firm features explain union membership. The presence of increasing returns
suggests that union density isn’t just a matter of exogenous worker preferences. Rather historical
shocks, potentially caused by brief institutional changes, can have long-lasting effects.
This feature appears to be driven by an equilibrium situation in which unions target their
organizing resources in high-density regions while employers limit their resistance to organizing
drives in these same regions. This has meant that, over time, America’s remaining union members
have become concentrated in ever fewer regions as the movement continues to contract. This
phenomenon crosses the private-public divide and explains why public sector unions appeared and
have thrived in the private sector union strongholds that arose during and after World War II. These
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results should be particularly worrying for the labour movement as they suggest that one-time
legislative moves to cripple the labour movement in states such as Wisconsin, Indiana, and
Michigan may result in an irreversible decline in union membership in those states.
3.2 The Literature: Regional Determinants of Union
Membership
Prior to entering into the empirical analysis, it is worthwhile to consider the current state of the
literature on the growth patterns of trade unions. This is not a simple task as the study of union
membership is fractured across many academic fields, which pursue their studies largely
independently. Below I summarize a representative, cross-section of this literature to give readers a
sense of what various disciplines have determined regarding the spatial distribution of union
membership.
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Figure 3.1 Figures generated as outlined in the Data Appendix from Source: Gallup (1937, 1939, 1945),
Troy (1957), Garlock (2009), and Hirsch and Macpherson (2010).
There are a range of studies by economists and sociologists that paint a fairly similar picture
of the determinants of union density. Koeller (1994) tests various potential determinants of union
activity at the state level from 1958 to 1982. Although he finds that organizing, management
opposition, and public policy all matter, structural changes in the labour force such as age, gender,
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and occupation have had the most significant impact on changing patterns of membership. Koeller
interprets these structural measures as proxies for broader structural changes in the economy. This
finding is consistent with previous work by Moore and Newman (1988). Hirsch and Berger (1984)
similarly find that firm and structural factors are primarily driving changes in union density. In
particular, they identify market concentration, capital intensity, the scale of production, and job
risk as key determinants of union membership. In a more recent study, Hirsch (2012) examines
economic dynamism and its role in changing union membership patterns. He points to the relatively
poor performance of union firms as driving the decline in density. This decline is concentrated in
manufacturing, construction, transportation, communications and utilities and is consistent with
previous papers. An interesting counterpoint to the fairly one-sided structural literature, Riddell
(1993) finds that density grew in similar patterns in Canada in the US until the mid 1950s at which
point a divergence occurred. Rather than pointing to structural factors for this divergence, Riddell
finds that the strongest factors discouraging membership in the US are a combination of employer
opposition and the legal framework.
There is also ample evidence that union-side, organizing decisions matter. Stepan-Norris and
Southworth (2010) find evidence that increasing unfair labour practices have discouraged union
organizing. Importantly, they also point to the important role of competition amongst unions in
driving union density. Farber and Western (2002) look at the nearly 50% decline in organizing
activity in the United States during the 1980s. This is one of the pivotal changes in US labour
strategy that appears to have hastened the movements’ sharp decline. Farber and Western find that
the collapse is not attributable to the PATCO dispute, but rather appears to be aligned with the
election of President Reagan and, hence, the shift in the political balance in Washington. This is
suggestive of the possibility that changes in labour institutions drove the decline in union organizing.
Finally, Weiler (1957) and Lalonde and Meltzer (1991) find that the success rate of unions in
certification elections has declined significantly through the post-war period, which explains a large
share of the decline in organizing drives. However, they are unable to answer why this ratio has
changed over time. Using data from Canada, Johnson (2002) confirms that union decline has been
driven by a combination of structural factors and declining certification drives.
We can also draw insights from the existing literature in economic history. Rees (1962) and
Huberman and Young (2002) both discuss the role that the rise of the CIO played in union growth
in the lead-up to and during World War II. A change in tactics and institutional support during this
era led to unions outlasting firms in disputes and gaining more members. This institutional change
during World War II was a marked shift from the American norm discussed by Friedman (2000)
in which US unions were generally forced to avoid state intervention.13 During this period, US
unions added an additional 6 million workers in 24,000 certification elections. However, this growth
13World War I is the other major example in which US unions actively benefited from US state intervention.
44
was halted in the post-war strike wave and the failure of Operation Dixie (Griffith, 1988). This is
consistent with work by Shorter and Tilly (1974), Friedman (1999), and Zolberg (1972) showing
that unions grow faster in strike years. Rosenbloom (1998) studies the use of strikebreakers in the
late 19th century, finding that their use is not correlated with the business cycle and are generally
used in small, isolated cities and regions outside of the northeast.
Only a handful of papers have explicitly considered the importance of the spatial factors for
union membership. Martin et al. (1993), three geographers studying post-1970 Britain, find that
the British labour movement has been particularly resilient in its traditional heartland. Rather than
pointing to an increasing returns phenomenon, the authors point to a failure to organize in new
growth sectors and the importance of local labour and employer culture.14 While they don’t use the
language of economics to identify the increasing returns phenomenon, this paper could certainly
be viewed as its qualitative predecessor. Wills (1996) considers the spatial dimension of trade
unionism in the banking sector, finding that, in a number of case studies, banks are more likely to be
organized and militant in labour’s heartland. In recent years, Wills has extended this point to argue
that community trade unionism will help expand labour’s reach beyond its heartland (Wills, 2002).
While the spatial dimension of trade union growth has largely been the domain of geographers,
there has been limited work by economists. Holmes (2006) is the most important economic work
highlighting the spatial dimension of union membership, finding that there is a strong relationship
between organized coal mines and steel mills in the 1950s and organized hospitals in the present.
Holmes’ result is framed as a “spillover” effect and is strong, indirect evidence in favour of an
increasing returns hypothesis.
Synthesizing the existing literature, there appears to be a consensus on a handful of the key
determinants to union membership. In particular, there is broad agreement that structural factors,
particularly industrial composition have been the primary drivers behind changes in union density
over time, while organizing drives and employer resistance appear to also play an important role.
In addition, although there is limited hard evidence, the work of Holmes (2006) and Martin et al.
(1993) are highly suggestive of an increasing regional returns phenomenon. Given these factors,
when conducting the empirical analysis in this papers, controls include a robust set of industrial
variables while organizing and employer resistance are each studied individually.
14This point is made in greater detail in their 2002 book.
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3.3 Analysis of State-level Union Membership Data
I begin the empirical analysis by examining the publicly available data on union membership with
spatial variation running back to the 1930s.15 From this data, we can answer a few basic questions.
How persistent has union membership been in heavily organized regions? What has state-level
variation in membership looked like over time? Are there distinct points of time at which union
membership have undergone a significant spatial rearrangement?
I generate various measures of spatial variation and persistence over time that provide insight
to the aforementioned questions.16 A summary of these measures is presented in Table 3.7. The
data reflect well-known long-term trends, the peaking of labour membership shortly after World
War II and the secular decline in membership and density since the end of war. This decline in
membership drives a significant decline in the variation of both membership and density from 1953
until the 1980s.
In general, union density and membership are both highly persistent. However, there is a single
break point in the spatial arrangement of union membership. There is a very large jump in the
level of persistence between 1939 and the post-war years, indicating that there may have been a
large, differentially applied shock that impacted union membership during the massive growth spurt
during World War II.
After the break point during World War II, the movement has undergone a continual decline
with high levels of regional persistence and decreasing variance as a result of a smaller labour
movement. When controlling for the aggregate size of the labour movement by looking at the share
of total union workers found in each state, the level of variation has started to increase over the last
20 years, which points towards a labour movement that is continuing to maintain its position in a
handful of relatively well organized states while declining elsewhere. Thus, there is some evidence
of increasing returns at present, while the relatively high level of persistence between today and
1886 is indicative of the importance of locational fundamentals.
3.4 Quasi-experimental Analysis: War Contracts and Break
Points
The data analysis points to a few clear facts. First, union density is highly persistent. Second,
while the variance of union density has declined over time, the variance in the share of total union
15Using a combination of existing studies, contemporary data sources, and historical surveys, I am able to assemble a
state-level panel of American union membership running back as far as 140 years. The construction of this dataset is
described in depth in the Data Appendix.
16The construction of these measures is described in detail in the Data Appendix.
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membership in a state has increased in recent decades. Third, there is both an increase in the
variance of union density and a sharp drop in the persistence rate between 1939 and 1953. These
facts point to the likelihood that the growth of unions is subject to regional increasing returns to
scale; however, the importance and scale of this effect is unclear.17
Thus, in order to gain a greater understanding of this potential phenomenon, it is necessary to
locate a meaningfully large, exogenous shock that either drastically decreased or increased union
membership differentially across states. With such a shock it is then possible to test whether a
one-time shock has a long-lasting effect or whether the union membership in the region would
revert to its prior status. Thankfully, the prior analysis points in the direction of a quasi-natural
experiment. The increase in variance and drastic decline in persistence between 1939 and 195318
suggests that a “break point” in union membership occurred over these years.
This break suggests that there likely exists some institutional or policy change over the course
of World War II that resulted in a spatially differentiated rate of growth of the labour movement
during World War II. Ideally, this feature would be exogenous while controlling for observables
such that it could be used in an instrumental variables analysis to provide causal estimates of the
impact of union growth during World War II on the rate of regional union growth after the war.
3.4.1 Quasi-experimental Analysis: Identifying the Exogenous Shock
This feature is readily identifiable upon a review of labor and industrial histories of World War II. It
is well known that the the government played a large and escalating role in manpower activities
(Baron et al., 1984), which included mediation between unions and employers.
In the late 1930s as war appeared ever more likely in Europe, the Roosevelt administration
created a series of government boards comprised of representatives from industry, unions, and
the public, which would serve to resolve industrial disputes with a particular emphasis placed on
industries that were essential to the war effort. In order of existence (these boards did not overlap;
each may be viewed as a continuation of their predecessors) these boards were: the National Defense
Advisory Committee (NDAC), the National Defense Mediation Board (NDMB), and the National
War Labor Board (NWLB).19 As the war progressed, the government viewed disruptions in the
17Although variance was largely stagnant in the 1970s and 1980s it does not mean that increasing returns were
not at work, as it is possible that there were changes in locational fundamentals in that time period such as industrial
composition that masked the effect.
18This same gap appears when instead using estimates derived from Gallup Polling for 1939 and 1945. However,
1953 is preferable as it is computed using the same data source as the 1939 figure.
19Some historians have downplayed labor’s role in these boards, but the NDAC did enact a series of labor principles
governing the War Department and the NDMB itself collapsed when the CIO representatives resigned from the board.
While Roosevelt was responsible for the first significant legal protections for unions, his policy during the war period
would be best described as anti-work stoppage rather than pro-labor (Cornford. and Miller, 1995).
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production of military products as ever more unacceptable it took greater and greater efforts to
discourage strikes and lockouts (Cornford. and Miller, 1995).
This effort to discourage work-stoppages was primarily enforced through an informal compact
between the government and the leaders of the AFL and CIO under which the unions agreed to not
strike in exchange for government protection in organizing campaigns, particularly campaigns to se-
cure the union shop.20 However, this compact was far from harmonious. The two-parties frequently
disagreed on on wage rates and while the leaders of the labour movement offered no-strike pledges
they were unable to control wildcat strikes by disgruntled and radicalized workers.21
The War Department itself was careful to never strictly side with unions or employers, but
because they were responsible for dolling out defense contracts, they played an active role in setting
the government’s labour policy. The debate over whether the War Department should withdraw
contracts from companies in violation of the Wagner Act began in late 1940 and continued through-
out the war. This debate was initially set off when the NDAC declared a set of labor principles
that the War Department adopted as a guide for issuing labor contracts. These principles required
that defense contracts comply with federal, state, and local laws regarding labor relations, wages,
hours, workman’s compensation, safety and other conditions for employment. This was a policy
that the War Department consistently altered; they would deny bids to employers based on their
labour history, but could also approve violators of the Wagner Act. Procurement Circular 43 took
this policy further and, in theory, required compliance with federal labor law in every invitation for
bids. This led directly to rejection of bids from habitual violators such as Ford and Bethlehem Steel.
Perhaps the most important example of this policy in action was the denial of a $100 million contract
to the Ford Motor Company. This decision was essential in securing the eventual settlement between
Ford and the United Auto Workers. However, after a year the circular was dropped, allowing the
War Department to make special exceptions.
Labour did not rely entirely on the government to protect their rights and unions would actively
conduct strikes for recognition. Typically, when an employer fought a union drive in an industry
important to the mobilization effort the union would file a complaint with the National War Labor
Board and the representatives of the public would typically back the representatives from labour
regarding a refusal to bargain from the employer and attempts to win the union shop. In some cases,
the ruling of the labor board was sufficient for the employer to grant the union shop or negotiate
with the union, however the board was limited in the tools at its disposal to enforce these rulings if
either the firm or the union failed to comply. In particular, the NWLB had a single primary tool at its
disposal, referring individual cases to the President who could sign an executive order, which would
20The union shop being a firm or division of a firm in which all workers are members of the union.
21In general the compact stymied many of labours’ demands regarding compensation, but facilitated its growth in
membership.
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enable the government, typically using a branch of the armed forces, to seize control of a company.
The government would then encourage the board of directors to replace the senior management
or, in the case of privately held companies, employ another firm to manage the violating company.
This new management was typically selected conditional on their willingness to comply with the
ruling of the NWLB.22
Since the NWLB was essentially given a “nuclear” option for enforcement without a lesser
mechanism, it was reluctant to actually employ this tool. In general, this option was primarily
applied to firms that were important to the war effort rather than firms at large. As such, the NWLB
granted significantly more protections to workers attempting to form a union or bargain with their
employer in key war industries than they did in other types of manufacturing. It is easy to flag these
industries in historical records as the War Manpower Commission (WMC) regularly published a
list of “essential activities” (U.S. War Manpower Commission, 1942) with the first list having been
developed in late 1942 (Mitchell, 2005). According to Kersten (2000), organizations such as the
Fair Employment Practices Commission would employ this list of essential war industries as a
guide, but could expand the list for their usage. For the purposes of identifying these industries in
this paper, I make use of the List and Index of Essential Activities published by the WMC in 1942.
This policy of providing greater protection to organizing drives and efforts to introduce the
union shop in essential war industries clearly suggests that an instrumental variables strategy that
can be used to determine the causal impact of a one-time shock in union membership on future
union growth. In particular, while controlling for regional demographics and industrial composition,
I instrument for the growth rate of unions during the 1939-1953 period using the share of firms in
the region that were essential to the war effort, as defined by the War Manpower Commission,23
and the value of war contracts provided to firms in the region. The second instrumental variable,
is attractive as it does not rely upon claims as to a definition of essential work, but rather weights
importance with a dollar value.
This analysis could be problematic if the one-time exogenous shock was not in fact temporary.
Fortunately, it is clear that this government intervention in labor relations beyond the NLRB did
not meaningfully survive World War II. The National War Labor Board ceased operations in 1946
and the last of the firms seized by the federal government were returned to private operation in
1946. Since the Second World War, it is the general consensus in the labor studies literature that
the federal government has not provided any meaningful support outside of the NLRB in unions’
efforts to organize firms. Even this limited form of institutional support is considered to be largely
ineffective (Cornford. and Miller, 1995). As such, given a robust set of industrial controls, we
22An example of this policy was the take-over of the North American Aviation Company in which the president
issued an executive order to take control of the firm over a strike regarding employment conditions.
23The War Manpower Commission detailed a subset of all manufacturing sectors that were essential to the effort. I
instrument with the share of all workers that were within this subset of manufacturing.
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should be quite confident in an empirical strategy based on this foundation
3.4.2 Quasi-experimental Analysis: Empirical Strategy
With these institutional features identified, it is possible to estimate the causal impact of historical
union growth24 on the future growth rate of both private and public sector unions using the two
instruments described above. The first instrument, the share of workers in a region who worked in
industries mandated as “essential activities” during World War II is based on the the list published
by the U.S. War Manpower Commission (1942) and the employment data for these industries is
gathered from the Census of Manufacturers (1939). The second instrument, the value of all war
contracts awarded to firms in a region comes from the County and City Databooks (2000) covering
the period. These instruments are used to conduct a two stage least squares analysis using each
instrument individually and the pair.
Deciding on the appropriate form of the regression is not necessarily clear. Since the labour
movement has contracted so substantially, it is likely that if an increasing returns phenomenon exists
it is the case that heavily unionized regions are losing membership more slowly than regions with a
fairly weak union presence. Furthermore, since unions rarely decertify, the disappearance of union
density is typically driven by two factors: increases in the size of the labour force and firm attrition.
With respect to firm attrition, we should expect density to decrease at a similar rate in high and low
density locations alike, meaning that with a 50% firm attrition rate and no new organizing, a region
with 20% density would fall to 10% while a region with 4% density would fall to 2%. Since firm
attrition and creation is likely the dominant factor in membership decline, this suggests that it isn’t
appropriate to simply choose the change in density as the outcome variable.
To deal with this concern, the dependent variable for this analysis is the percentage change in
union density in region, x, between 1953 and any future time period while the independent variable
is the absolute change in union membership between 1939 and 1953.25 This functional form is
ideal as it allows for a broad definition of economies of scale that accounts for the fact that union
density decline is being driven by firm attrition and creation. In addition, I control for a broad array
of industry employment levels and population demographics. This combination of controls pushes
the data as far as it can go, as a result of the small sample size.
Thus, the baseline specification for the initial OLS analysis is:
24In the instance of this paper, historical union growth happens to be entirely in the private sector.
25Note that this analysis is robust to using the less precise estimates derived from Gallup Polling with 1939 and 1945
as the start and end points.
50
UYi −U1953i
U1953i
= α+β2(U1953i −U1939i )+β2Xi + ei
Where UYi is union density in state i in year Y , Xi is a vector of industrial and demographic
covariates in state i, and ei is an error term.
In the two stage least squares analysis, the first stage regression is:
(U1953i −U1939i ) = γ+δ1Wi +δ2Ci +δ3Xi + vi
Where Wi is the share of workers in state i working in a war industry as of 1940, Ci is the value
of war contracts received by state i through the war, UYi is union density in state i in year Y , Xi is a
vector of industrial and demographic covariates in state i, and vi is an error term.
In the second stage, I then regress U
Y
i −U1953i
U1953i
on the predicted values from the first stage regression
and additional control variables.
In addition, I perform a number of robustness tests regarding the validity of the instruments
and the broader results. In particular, I perform regressions with the instruments using union
membership in both 1939 and 1953 as the dependent variable and the instruments and other controls
for the relevant year as independent variables. I also perform this test using the pre-war trend in
union membership between 1937 and 1939 as the dependent variable. If the instruments are in fact
valid, they should prove to be strong predictors in 1953, but have little predictive power in 1939 or
for the pre-war trend. I also perform an over-identification test and report the results.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that it would be ideal to control for the pre-war growth
rate. Unfortunately, I am only able to construct a pre-war growth rate running from 1937 to 1939.
Although not ideal, I do perform a series of robustness checks using this pre-war growth rate.
3.4.3 Quasi-experimental Analysis: Data
The instrumental variables analysis is conducted at the state level using the union density data
discussed earlier in the paper.26 Using this data, I construct the change in union density over the
war period, 1939-1953 and the percentage change in total density from 1953-2004.
The primary data for the instrumental variables, the dollar value of war contracts assigned to a
state, is gathered from the County and State Data Book from 1944. These data are divided into 4
separate categories which I combine into a single instrumental variable and can also use individual
as 4 instrumental variables. These include: funds directed towards military projects, funds for
26This includes a total of 47 states as a handful of states have gaps in the 1939 and 1953 periods.
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industrial projects, contracts for combat equipment, and other war-related contracts. The intensity
of this shock is straightforward: the greater the number of war contracts entering the region, the
greater the incentive for firms to ensure compliance with the NLRB and NWLB.
As an alternative instrumental variable that should capture similar variation, I am able to instru-
ment for the share of regional employment that was included on the War Manpower Commission’s
listing of essential war industries (U.S. War Manpower Commission, 1942). The War Manpower
Commission denoted specific industries, which were a subset of all manufacturing work, that was
considered essential to the war effort. The data for this instrument are gathered from the 1939
Census of Manufacturers and then divided based on the listings released by the War Manpower
Commission. This measure captures the potential for the awarding of war contracts as it is likely
that the vast majority of firms in “essential” war industries would have been eligible for federal war
contracts.
To ensure that these shocks are not simply capturing time series effects for regions with a greater
share of manufacturing, demographics, government funding or legal institutions, I include controls
for an array of demographic and industrial controls gathered from the County and City Data Books
(2000). The complete list of controls is available in the Appendix.
3.4.4 Quasi-experimental Analysis: Evidence
Prior to reporting the results of the regression analysis, it is informative to look at the data visually
to get a sense to the broader trends.
Figure 3.2 displays the correlation between union growth from 1939-53 to the percent change in
union density between 1953 and 2000. If the shocks were, in fact temporary, we would expect the
slope of the best-fit line to be negative. If the shocks were durable, but did not impact the future rate
of union growth we would expect a flat slope. However, we instead see a positive slope, which is
indicative of an increasing returns relationship.
Similarly, we see a positive slope in Figure 3.3 when we replace the change in total membership
from 1953-2000 with public sector density in 2000, which is equivalent to the change in public
sector membership over the time period. This is a result of the fact that no public sector unions had
been certified as of 1953.
These figures are both strongly suggestive of an increasing returns relationship. The base-
line OLS regression results in which the percentage change in density between 1953 and 2000 is
regressed on the change in density between 1939 and 1953 are also strongly supportive of this
interpretation. These results are presented in Table 3.1.
Although not statistically significant, the point estimates suggest that for an average state that
saw union density increase by approximately 10% of the labour force, that historical boost has
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resulted in 4% to 6% percent increase in union density. Note that this increase is not a change in
the raw density figure, but rather a change in the percentage increase in union density over time.
While the results in Table 3.1 are certainly not conclusive, they again suggest the likelihood of an
increasing returns relationship, as the the coefficient is positive in all three cases and significant
with the full set of controls.
The picture when considering public sector density, which was non-existent in the 1939-53
period, is even clearer. The OLS results, displayed in Table 3.1, depict a strong relationship between
changes in public sector membership from 1953-2000 and changes in private sector density from
1939-1953. The point estimates suggest that the war boost between 1939 and 1953 for a typical
state has increased the percent of the public sector organized in 2000 by 21-24%. It is important to
note that this is an increase in absolute public sector union density. A percentage increase cannot be
considered as public sector bargaining is not legal at the start of the period.
It is possible, however, that both sets of OLS results could be meaningfully biased. For example,
it is possible that some form of state fundamentals, be them demographic, economic, or institutional
that drove increasing membership between 1939 and 1953 could be driving changes in membership
from 1953-2000. For example, if a state had witnessed a particularly ugly strike or lockout during
the earlier period it may have generated a regional culture of fear around organizing, which could
in fact determine union membership in both periods. Another possibility would be the presence
of racial tensions in the American South, which likely undermined organizing during the war and
may continue to undermine organizing possibilities. Given this concern, I turn to the instrumental
variables analysis for conclusive results.
The results from the first stage of the 2SLS regressions are displayed in Table 3.2. The results
are strong, positive, and significant indicating that unions grew much more rapidly in regions with
many war industries or war contracts. The instruments are economically and statistically significant
and the F-values are sufficiently high to not raise concerns regarding a weak instruments problem.
For a visual sense of this relationship refer to Figure 3.4. It provides further visual support for the
power of the war contract instrument, as it is visually clear that regions that the received the most
war contracts have witnessed the greatest growth in public sector density.
Given these first stage results, the instrumental variables have sufficient power for the analysis.
Further, the F-statistic against the null that the excluded instruments are irrelevant in the first stage
is 15 or greater, indicating that the results are robust to a weak instruments criticism. However,
this does not mean that they are necessarily valid. A simple method to get a sense of whether the
instruments are truly valid is to run separate OLS regressions with union density in 1939 and 1953
as the dependent variables and an array of independent variables, principally the two instrumental
variables. If valid we should expect the instrumental variables to have large treatment effects in
1953, but no meaningful treatment effects in 1939. The results of these regressions are presented in
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Table 3.3. There are large differences in the coefficients on the instruments in 1939 and 1953, with
the treatment effects being larger in 1953. However, this difference is only statistically significant
for the war contracts instrument. As such, those are the preferred estimates in the IV analysis,
although I do report results with the war industries instrumental variable, as although not statistically
significant, the difference is still large. Similarly, I run the regressions with the 1937 to 1939
union membership pre-trend as the dependent variable and neither instrument is found to have any
predictive power. In addition, over-identification tests for the instrumental variable specifications
result in a p-value of approximately 0.75, indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the instruments are exogenous. As a further robustness check, I perform a reduced form analysis in
which I consider the direct impact of the instruments on union growth post-war and present-day
public sector union density. In general, the results regarding public sector union density should
be considered the strongest as there are few other viable pathways through which historical war
contracts could impact public sector union membership than increasing returns.
Having considered the power and validity of the instrumental variables strategy, I next analyze
the second stage results and to determine whether the one-time shock to union density during the
Second World War is temporary or durable in its effects.
The second stage results, presented in Table 3.2, indicate an economically and statistically
significant positive relationship between union growth during World War II and growth post-war.
The treatment effect is quite large with a a typical state, experiencing a 10% increase in density
during the war, seeing a subsequent 12% to 15% percent increase in density between 1953 and
2000. A one standard deviation increase in the change in union density between 1939 and 1953
(4.817%) would result in a percentage increase in union density between 1953 and 2000 of 6.1%
to 7.1%. This is clear evidence of the increasing returns to union density phenomenon. In other
words, regions that witnessed the most union growth during World War II have seen the smallest
decline in union membership since. In fact, it’s overwhelmingly the case that states that we view as
labour’s heartland today such as Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania were also the heartland of
American war production.
We can also look to the second stage results with public density as the outcome variable in
Table 3.2. This relationship is is also economically and statistically significant with public sector
density alone, which should be the cleanest signal of the increasing returns phenomenon. The
average treatment effect is quite large, resulting in a 25% to 31% increase in public sector density
subsequently. A one standard deviation increase in the change in union density between 1939 and
1953 (4.817%) would result in current day public sector union density being between 12.2% and
15.3% greater. Having confirmed that the increasing returns phenomenon is a dominant feature driv-
ing the arrangement of union membership, the next step is to turn our attention to the mechanisms
driving this permanence and the increasing returns phenomenon.
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3.5 Causal Mechanisms
The results in the prior section show clear evidence that the regional gains made by the union
movement were long-lasting and were subject to significant increasing returns to union density.
Given the robust controls used, which should largely account for industry-specific union attrition,
there are only a few plausible mechanisms that could be driving this effect.
First and foremost amongst these are organizing decisions. Unions themselves may be choosing
to organize,27 both in the private and the public sectors, in regions that are already the most highly
organized. This mechanism could be driven by a variety of factors. For example, the presence of
large numbers of union members in an area may result in a cultural shift making workers more
likely to support a union drive. It may also be easier for unions to mount the resources needed to run
an organizing drive in union-heavy states, particularly those unions that conduct organizing through
their state federations rather than through the international. Directly related to organizing drives,
high local membership may make workers themselves more receptive to joining a union, which
could be an underlying explanation for targeted union drives to high-density regions or simply result
in a greater election win rate.
Beyond organizing it may also be the case that high local union membership creates a culture
in which employers are less willing to abuse their employees or fight organizing drives (legally or
illegally). This could result from local boycotts or support, but it could also be a process through
which employers learn how to function in a union environment.
A final potential mechanism is that high local membership may result in a more pro-union legal
environment, which could open membership to additional workers, allow for the union or agency
fee shop, or aid in organizing drives. In the subsections below, I analyze these mechanisms.
3.5.1 Causal Mechanisms: Organizing
Using a similar regression strategy to that employed in the main body of the paper, I analyze whether
unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO conduct more or less organizing drives in regions of the country
that witnessed the greatest level of growth during World War II. Along with the data described
previously, I merge the primary dataset with the Food and Allied Service Trades union organizing
database from the AFL-CIO research department. This dataset includes all organizing drives that
occurred between 1964 and 2001.
The regression analysis, found in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, shows that AFL-CIO unions have clearly
conducted more organizing drives28 in regions that witnessed the highest rates of union growth
27Note that this refers to both the active central decision of a national union or state federation or the decision of
workers on the shop floor to initiate a grassroots organizing drive
28There have also been more elections and more successful elections.
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over the war period. While not a particularly surprising result, it indicates that not only are unions
maintaining more membership in high density regions, but that they are replacing attrition with
newly organized members.
In addition, from the previously reported public sector density results the regions that wit-
nessed the greatest growth in unions during World War II have also seen the greatest increase in
representation of the public sector workers.
These results are unsurprising, but they do indicate that the increasing returns phenomenon
is not simply driven by differential attrition, but by the differential creation of new unions. What
these results cannot tell us, unfortunately is why these unions are choosing to organize in these high
density regions, although this could be driven by employer resistance or legal institutions, which
are considered below.
3.5.2 Causal Mechanisms: Legal Institutions
In order to test for the importance of legal institutions in this relationship I employ two measures.
First, I employ an index of public sector collective bargaining rights generated from the data in
Freeman and Valletta (1988). The nature of this index variable is described in detail in the Data
Appendix. Second, I use a binary variable as the outcome as to whether a state is “right-to-work,”
as of 2004 meaning that it is illegal for unions to negotiate a union security clause.
As shown in Figure 3.7, the correlation between an index covering access to public sector col-
lective bargaining rights and the growth of private sector unions during the 1939-53 period is fairly
weak. This result is confirmed in regression analyses which find no economically or statistically
significant relationship between historical private sector density and the legislation index.
However, if instead we consider the relationship between historical union growth and the “right-
to-work” status of a state we can see a clear negative relationship between historical union growth
and right-to-work status, as displayed in the regression analysis displayed in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.
These results show a robust negative relationship between union growth from 1939-53 and the
Right-to-Work status of a state as of 2004.
This suggests that private sector unions did play a role in shaping state-level labour law in
one of two ways. Firstly, it is possible that unions were able to exert much greater influence over
the state-wide ballot propositions that have typically been used to enact right-to-work legislation.
Secondly, it is potentially the case that even in states with the strongest unions historically they only
had the political strength to influence this one dimension of the political spectrum.
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3.5.3 Causal Mechanisms: Employer Resistance
The final mechanism that I consider is whether historical union density is related in anyway to
employers’ response to unions in the workplace or organizing campaigns. While there is no perfect
measure for employer resistance, I make use of NLRB unfair labour practice (ULPs) charges as a
measure of resistance. I have these measures both for existing unions and union drives courtesy
of the AFL-CIO FAST database. As in the analysis of organizing drives, I make use of the total
number of allegations that have occurred post 1964.
While not conclusive, the results indicate that regions with the greatest union growth during the
war period have had the fewest numbers of unfair labour practice chargers per worker since. This
could play into the increasing returns phenomenon in several ways. For example, it could mean that
attrition is lower in those regions or, as is more likely the case, that organizing campaigns and first
contract campaigns have a much greater rate of success.
3.6 Conclusion
While the American labour movement has been in a steady decline for the last 50 years, this paper
provides a better understanding of the dynamics of labour’s decline and its preceding growth. Union
density has been highly persistent with only a major spatial re-arrangements occurring during
World War II. But the defining feature of the growth and decline of the union movement is the
fundamentally important role played by increasing returns. States that received the “war boost”
in the 1940s are the states that still have a meaningful labour presence today, with their levels of
union density declining at a much slower rate than less organized states. It appears that that this
relationship may be driven by an equilibrium in which unions invest the majority of their organizing
resources into “union” states and employers in “union” states put up significantly less resistance
than in other states.
These results should be particularly worrying for the labour movement as they suggest that
one-time legislative moves to cripple the labour movement in states such as Wisconsin, Indiana,
and Michigan may result in an irreversible decline in union membership. With some unions in
Wisconsin losing nearly half of their members in the wake of Governor Walker’s clampdown on
collective bargaining rights (Belkin and s Maher, n.d.), it appears unlikely that a reversal of his
legislation will restore the state’s prior level of union membership.
For the American labour movement to recover, the results of this paper indicate that the move-
ment needs another “game-changing” moment. The unfortunate reality of labour’s current situation
is that in the status quo it doesn’t matter how many wins they have; all it takes is one sudden
legislative move such as in Wisconsin or Michigan to permanently cripple labour’s ability to grow in
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the state. And given the stagnation and decline in union membership in Canada, where card-check
is more frequently available it is not clear that even the passage of the Employee Free Choice Act
would have been sufficient to meaningfully reverse this trend.
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3.7 Appendix: Data
In studying regional union membership patterns there are two types of datasets that can be con-
structed: a long-run panel of state-level union density and a short-run panel of MSA-level union
density. These are very different units of analysis and the most interesting analysis can only occur
at the state-level as a result of data limitations, as modern MSA-level information is only available
starting in the 1980s. The advantage of working at the state-level, however, is that while the
boundaries of MSAs may change state boundaries are constant. This is convenient as changing
MSA boundaries could certainly drive changes in density rather than any real activity.
3.7.1 Data Collection
The state-level data are gathered from a variety of sources. Beginning in 1937, it becomes possible
to estimate a state-level measure of union density using results from dozens of Gallup Polling
surveys. Using the weights from iPoll, I generate estimates of state-level union density in 1937,
1939, and 1945.
The regularity of available data remains scarce until 1964. I use a combination of state member-
ship totals from the NBER (1939, 1953), from Troy (1957), and the BLS (1964-1973) pre-1974.
From 1974 onwards, annual state-level union density data can be derived from the CPS which is
provided courtesy of Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). While the CPS data are a direct measure of
density, the NBER and BLS data are based on the membership records of individual unions rather
than the sampling of individuals. As such, these 3 data sources are, as with the Knights of Labor
Data, not perfectly suited for direct comparison, although certainly the best figures available.
3.7.2 Dependent Variable Choice
It is not immediately clear what the correct metric should be when considering the spatial and
temporal growth of the labour membership. Union density, the share of eligible workers who are
members or service-fee payers of a union is the measure typically used. The advantage of employing
union density is that it allows direct comparisons between regions of different populations and
sizes. As such, I make use of union density as the primary measure in this analysis. However,
employing union density rather than membership masks some of the underlying variation in the
data. In particular, density may fall as a result of either a decline in absolute union membership or a
growth in population. As such, I also conduct the analysis using total membership figures and the
share of all union members in the United States in a region. Analyzing changes in the variation of
the share of union members in a state is particularly useful for developing a sense as to whether
59
union growth and contraction are occurring proportionately across low and high-density states.
3.7.3 Metrics and Methodology
I use three different measures to analyze union variation over time: the relative variation of log
union membership, the relative variation of union density, and the relative variation of the share of
all union members in region x. These numbers are relative in that I divide the variance in year y by
the variance in 2004.
All three variance measures capture, to varying degrees, the concentration of the labour move-
ment, with important differences in their interpretation. It is useful to calculate the relative variation
for both total membership and density, as it allows us to get an idea as to whether changes in density
are being driven by decreasing membership or increases in the labour force. The relative variation
in the share of all union members in a state is a particularly useful measure as it captures whether
changes in variance are driven by overall decline in union membership or a spatial relocation of
trade union members.
To analyze the degree of persistence in the data, I use two measures: the raw density correlation
in year y with density in 2004 and the rank density correlation in year y with the rank density in 2004.
As in the analysis of relative variation, these two measures are meant to capture whether changes in
persistence are driven by changing union membership or changing population. In addition, these
measures are able to indicate whether labour’s heartland is locationally shifting over time.
3.7.4 Data Analysis
Union density remained low throughout most of the early 20th century, generally hovering in the
10% to 13% range, aside from a temporary blip during World War I. The picture drastically shifts
in the 1930s with a combination of an increasing union wage premium, better public opinion of
unions, and the passage of the National Industrial Recover Act (NIRA) that introduced legislative
protections for collective bargaining. This combination of factors led to a dramatic increase in
union membership preceding World War II and previously unseen levels of membership, density,
and variance. Prior to World War II, variance in membership and density typically moved with
total union membership. A key observation is that the variance in the share of membership initially
peaked in 1939 at 1.6 times contemporary variance.
The next available data points are in 1945 (from Gallup polling) and 1953 (from AFL-CIO
membership information), after the Second World War. During the war itself we see a second
expansion in union density in which both density and variance reach their peak at the 1953 data
point. Even with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 and the introduction of right-to-work
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legislation across much of the south, union density would continue to climb for several more years
after this period reaching nearly 40% nationally in the late 1950s.
From this point onwards, the labour movement undergoes a near continuous decline in the vari-
ance of both membership and density. However, the variance in the share of total union membership
in a state remains relatively stable from 1964 until the the 1980s at which point it begins to climb.
This could indicate that the labour movement was able to leverage its national power to enable
organizing in relatively low density regions until labour’s power began to collapse in the Reagan
era. In particular, this phenomenon could be linked to the roughly 50% decline in organizing during
the Reagan administration, which may have disproportionately affected low density states. The rise
in the variance of the share of membership in a state throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s along
with the relatively high variance prior to labour’s growth in World War II suggests that when labour
struggles, it tends to concentrate in smaller and smaller geographic pockets.
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3.8 Appendix: Figures
Union Density Growth 1939-1953 and Percentage Change in Union Density Since WWII
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Union Growth During WW2 vs Post−war Growth
Figure 3.2 This figure plots the absolute change in union density between 1939 and 1953 on the x axis
versus the change percentage change in union density between 1953 and 2000 on the y axis. Source: Gallup
Organization (1939, 1945), Troy (1957), Hirsch and Macpherson (2010).
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Union Density Growth 1939-1953 and Contemporary Public Sector Union Density
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Growth During WW2 vs Public Sector Density in 2000
Figure 3.3 This figure compares contemporary public sector union density to the abolute change in union
density during the Second World War. The current level of public sector union density is also the the change
since 1953, as public sector union density was non-existent at that point in time. Source: Gallup Organization
(1939, 1945), Troy (1957), Hirsch and Macpherson (2010).
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Union Density Growth 1939-1953 and Total Value of War Contracts
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War Contract Allocations and Union Growth
Figure 3.4 This figures compares the absolute change in union density during the Second World War to the
total value of governmental war contracts granted to firms located in the state. War contracts are in billions of
dollars. Source: Gallup (1937, 1945) Troy (1957), County and State Data Book (2000).
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Contemporary Public Sector Union Density and Total Value of War Contracts
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Public Sector Density in 2000 vs War Contracts
Figure 3.5 This figure compares contemporary public sector union density in 2000 to the total value of
governmental war contracts assigned to firms located in the state during the Second World War. War contracts
are in billions of dollars. Source: County and State Data Book (2000), Hirsch and Macpherson (2010).
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Union Elections Post-1963 and Union Growth 1939-53
Figure 3.6 This figure compares to the total number of union elections contained in the FAST database
to the absolute change in union density during the Second World War. Source: Gallup (1939, 1945), Troy
(1957), Food and Allied Service Trades (2000).
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Public Sector Labour Law Index and Union Growth 1939-53
Figure 3.7 This figure compares the public sector labour law index from Freeman and Valletta (1988) to the
absolute change in union density during the Second World War. Source: Gallup (1939, 1945), Troy (1957),
Freeman and Valletta (1988).
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Right-to-Work and Union Growth 1939-53
Figure 3.8 This figure compares whether states have enacted either right-to-work legislation or a constitu-
tional amendment to the change in union density during the Second World War. Source: Gallup (1939, 1945),
Troy (1957).
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Unfair Labour Practices and Union Growth 1939-53
Figure 3.9 This figure compares the total number of unfair labour practices post-1963 from the Food and
Allied Service Trades Database to the absolute change in union density during the Second World War. Source:
Gallup (1939, 1945), Troy (1957), Food and Allied Service Trades (2000).
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3.9 Appendix: Tables
OLS Regressions with Private and Public Sector Union Density
A. Dependent Variable: Percent Change in Union Density 1953-2000
Change in Union Density 1939-1953 .006∗ .004
[0.003] [0.003]
Observations 47 47
R2 0.074 0.48
Covariates E, D
B. Dependent Variable: Change in Public Sector Density 1953-2000
Change in Union Density 1939-1953 2.4∗∗∗ 2.1∗∗∗
[0.41] [0.45]
Observations 47 47
R2 0.43 0.86
Covariates E, D
Table 3.1 The models presented are least-squares estimates of equation 1. The primary independent variable
is the change in union density between 1939 and 1953. D represents a robust set of demographic controls,
which are fully listed in the Data Appendix while E represents a set of employment and industrial controls.
Source: Gallup (1939, 1945) Troy (1957), Hirsch and Macpherson (2010), County and State Databook
(2000), Census of Manufacturers (1939).
70
2SLS Instrumental Variables Analysis
Stage 1. Dependent Variable: Change in Union Density 1939-1953
War Industries 150.616∗∗∗ 122.972∗∗∗
[28.733] [228.416]
Total Contracts 1.201∗∗∗ .761∗∗∗
[0.321] [0.282]
Observations 47 47 47
R2 0.83 0.88 0.91
Covariates E,D E, D E, D
Stage 2a. Dependent Variable: Percent Change in Union Density 1953-2000
Change in Union Density 1939-1953 .0126∗∗ .0148∗ .0131∗∗
[0.00599] [0.00829] [0.00581]
Observations 47 47
R2 0.89 0.89 0.89
Covariates E,D E, D E, D
Stage 2b. Dependent Variable: Public Sector Union Density in 2000
Change in Union Density 1939-1953 2.846∗∗∗ 3.174∗∗∗ 2.537∗∗∗
[0.618] [0.724] [0.676]
Observations 47 47
R2 0.46 0.33 0.33
Covariates E,D E, D E, D
Table 3.2 The models presented are two-stage least-squares estimates of equations 2 and 3. In the first stage,
the change in union density between 1939 and 1953 is regressed on the share of workers in a war industry
or the value of allocated war contracts. Stage 2a has the percentage change in total union density as the
dependent variable while Stage 2b has the change in public sector union density. Specification one includes
war contracts, specification two includes the share of workers in war industries, and specification three
includes both instruments. D represents a robust set of demographic controls, which are fully listed in the
Data Appendix while E represents a set of employment and industrial controls. Source: Gallup (1939, 1945)
Troy (1957), Hirsch and Macpherson (2010), County and State Databook (2000), Census of Manufacturers
(1939).
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Instrument Variables Validity Test
Dependent Variable - Union density
Year 1939 1953 Pre-War Trend
War Industries 0.412 1.60∗∗ -3.54
[0.384] [0.743] [93.545]
Total Contracts 0.00288 0.0244∗∗∗ 1.06
[0.00277] [0.00559] [0.628]
Obs. 47 47 47
Covariates E, D E, D E, D
Table 3.3 OLS regressions of union density in 1939 or 1953 and the pre-war change in union density on
the share of workers employed in war industries during World War II and the value of war contracts allocated
to a state. D represents a robust set of demographic controls, which are fully listed in the Data Appendix
while E represents a set of employment and industrial controls. Source: Gallup (1939, 1945) Troy (1957),
Hirsch and Macpherson (2010), County and State Databook (2000), Census of Manufacturers (1939).
Reduced Form Regressions Using the Instrumental Variables
A. Dependent Variable: Percent Change in Union Density 1953-2000
War Industries 0.00453 -0.00210
[0.00329] [0.00768]
Total Contracts 1.317 2.223∗
[1.000648] [1.151]
Observations 47 47
R2 0.13 0.35
Covariates E, D
B. Dependent Variable: Change in Public Sector Density 1953-2000
War Industries 1.151∗∗∗ 2.937∗∗
[0.387] [0.937]
Total Contracts 300.198∗∗ 190.0944
[117.898] [140.455]
Observations 47 47
R2 0.46 0.57
Covariates E, D
Table 3.4 The models presented are least-squares estimates. D represents a robust set of demographic
controls, which are fully listed in the Data Appendix while E represents a set of employment and industrial
controls. Source: Gallup (1939, 1945) Troy (1957), Hirsch and Macpherson (2010), County and State
Databook (2000), Census of Manufacturers (1939).
72
OLS Mechanism Regressions
A. Dependent Variable: Number of Union Elections post-1964
Change in Union Density 1939-1953 182.83∗∗∗ 72.08∗∗
[60.57] [24.43]
Observations 47 47
R2 0.18 0.92
Covariates E, D
B. Dependent Variable: Public Sector Labour Law Index
Change in Union Density 1939-1953 -0.0043 -0.0043
[0.0068] [0.0081]
Observations 47 47
R2 0.01 0.68
Covariates E, D
C. Dependent Variable: Right-to-Work Status
Change in Union Density 1939-1953 -0.054∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗
[0.013] [0.015]
Observations 47 47
R2 0.28 0.46
Covariates E, D
D. Dependent Variable: Number of ULP Charges per million members post-1964
Change in Union Density 1939-1953 1072.55∗∗ 358.91∗∗
[416.41] [172.90]
Observations 47 47
R2 0.14 0.93
Covariates E, D
Table 3.5 The models presented are least-squares estimates of equation 1, but with alternate dependent
variables: A. The number of union elections post-1964 is regressed on the the change in union density between
1939 and 1953; B. The value of a public sector labour law index is regressed on the the change in union
density between 1939 and 1953; C. Aright-to-work dummy is regressed on the the change in union density
between 1939 and 1953; D. The number of ULPs post-1964 is regressed on the the change in union density
between 1939 and 1953. D represents a robust set of demographic controls, which are fully listed in the Data
Appendix while E represents a set of employment and industrial controls. Source: Gallup (1939, 1945) Troy
(1957), Hirsch and Macpherson (2010), County and State Databook (2000), Census of Manufacturers (1939).
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IV Second Stage Mechanism Regressions
A. Dependent Variable: Number of Union Elections post-1964
Change in Union Density 1939-1953 264.64∗∗∗ 86.66∗ 151.17∗∗∗
[84.33] [50.97] [48.09]
Observations 47 47 47
R2 0.91 0.88 0.91
Instruments 1, 2 2 1
Covariates E, D E, D E, D
B. Dependent Variable: Public Sector Labour Law Index
Change in Union Density 1939-1953 -0.0019 0.010 -0.010
[0.011] [0.012] [0.012]
Observations 47 47 47
R2 0.07 0.04 0.08
Instruments 1, 2 2 1
Covariates E, D E, D E, D
C. Dependent Variable: Right-to-Work Status
Change in Union Density 1939-1953 -0.054∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗
[0.032] [0.030] [0.026]
Observations 47 47 47
R2 0.29 0.34 0.32
Instruments 1, 2 2 1
Covariates E, D E, D E, D
D. Dependent Variable: Number of ULP Charges post-1964
Change in Union Density 1939-1953 550.802∗∗ 967.648∗∗∗ 220.456∗
[220.172] [291.858] [240.151]
Observations 47 47 47
R2 0.90 0.87 0.90
Instruments 1, 2 2 1
Covariates E, D E, D E, D
Table 3.6 The models presented are the second stage of the least-squares estimates of equations 2 and 3,
but with alternate dependent variables: A. The number of union elections post-1964 is regressed on the the
change in union density between 1939 and 1953; B. The value of a public sector labour law index is regressed
on the the change in union density between 1939 and 1953; C. Aright-to-work dummy is regressed on the the
change in union density between 1939 and 1953; D. The number of ULPs post-1964 is regressed on the the
change in union density between 1939 and 1953. D represents a robust set of demographic controls, which
are fully listed in the Data Appendix while E represents a set of employment and industrial controls. Source:
Gallup (1939, 1945) Troy (1957), Hirsch and Macpherson (2010), County and State Databook (2000), Census
of Manufacturers (1939).
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Summary Statistics Over Time
Year Membership Density Relative Var
of Density
Relative Var
of Share
Density Raw
Corr With
2004
Density
Rank Corr
With 2004
History
1939 8.8 21.5 3.13 1.60 0.58 0.61 Start of World War 2. The
National Industrial Recov-
ery Act and the Wagner
Act are passed in 1933
and 1935 respectively. The
Fair Labor Standards Act
is passed in 1938.
1953 16.2 32.6 4.31 0.94 0.78 0.79 Earliest post-war data
available. The Taft-
Hartley Act is passed
in 1947. Florida and
Arkansas pass the first
right-to-work legislation
in 1944. Passage of the
LMRDA.
1964 17.9 29.3 3.63 0.871 0.87 0.88 The AFL and CIO merge
in 1955. The Landrum-
Griffith Act is passed in
1959. The National Farm
Workers Association (later
the UFW) is founded in
1962.
1974 18.2 26.2 2.70 0.86 0.88 0.90 Passage of OSHA in 1970.
First major postal worker
strike. UFW reach an
agreement with graper
growers.
1984 17.3 19.1 1.72 0.84 0.94 0.92 Reagan breaks the PATCO
in 1981, resulting in a mas-
sive decrease in union or-
ganizing and an acceler-
ated decline in union mem-
bership.
1994 16.7 15.7 1.25 0.84 0.95 0.94 NAFTA is passed in 1994.
2004 15.4 12.6 1 1 1 1
Table 3.7 Figures generated as outlined in the paper body from Source: Gallup (1937, 1939, 1945), Troy
(1957), Garlock (2009), and Hirsch and Macpherson (2010).
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Chapter 4
The Slave Trade, State Behaviour, and
Ethnic Stratification in Africa
4.1 Introduction
The last decade has been a golden age for the study of African economic history. As noted by Hop-
kins (2009) “economists have produced a new economic history of Africa in the course of the past
decade,” with two primary narratives. The first narrative argues that “Africa has suffered a ‘reversal
of fortune’ during the past 500 years.” The second narrative suggests that “ethnic fragmentation,
which has deep historical roots, is a distinct cause of African economic backwardness (page 155).”
In this article, we argue that these narratives are fundamentally interconnected. In particular, we
argue that Africa’s slave trade, which helped drive its “reversal of fortune,” increased the degree of
ethnic fragmentation in Africa today. This chapter is a combination of two papers: Whatley and
Gillezeau (2011a) and Whatley and Gillezeau (2011b). In the first of these articles, we develop
a model showing how increasing prices for slaves may have altered state behaviour in a manner
consistent with increasing ethnic stratification over time. In the second article, we empirically test
this relationship.
To prelude the results, using both OLS and instrumental variables analysis, we find an eco-
nomically and statistically significant positive relationship between various measures of ethnic
fragmentation in the present and slave exports from the western coast of Africa in the past. This
finding is entirely consistent with our model under which increasing slave prices brought on by
European demand would encourage smaller states, more slave raiding, and greater ethnic diver-
sity. These results are significant when considered in the context of other recent work in African
economic history. In particular, the results aid in the interpretation of Nathan Nunn’s analysis of
the slave trade and GDP (Nunn, 2008a) in which he finds that the transatlantic slave trade resulted
in the long-term, systematic underdevelopment of many African economies. This work does not
capture the mechanism through which this underdevelopment may have occurred and while Nunn
and Wantchekon (2011) make an effort to explain the process through the development of mistrust
it seems unlikely that this is the only causal mechanism. The strong positive relationship between
ethnic fractionalization and slave exports found in this paper suggests that increased ethnic fraction-
alization may have been a prominent factor in this underdevelopment. This would be consistent
76
with work by Levine and Easterly (1997), Collier (1998), Bates (2008) and others, but rather than
see ethnic fractionalization as an exogenous source of social conflict this paper presents evidence
that it is also an endogenous outcome of the social conflict associated with slaving. Finally, this
paper cautions that controlling for ethnic fractionalization will result in underestimates of the impact
of slavery on development.
This chapter begins with a description of the existing literature on ethnic identity, the slave
trade, and the relationship of these elements to development in Africa. This is followed by a
description of the empirical strategy for determining the relationship between the slave trade and
contemporary ethnic stratification and the results of the empirical analysis. Following this, we
develop a model that explains how European demand for slaves may have altered the behaviour of
historical African states in a manner that could explain this result. We conclude by considering the
broader implications of this work.
4.2 Ethnic Identity, the Slave Trade, and Development
A number of important studies have focused on ethnic stratification and its exogenous impact on
economic performance in Africa. The best known is a study by Levine and Easterly (1997) which
argues that roughly 25 percent of the difference in the growth experiences of African and Asian
economies can be attributed to the greater ethnic diversity in Africa. While it is unclear precisely
how ethnicity influences economic performance, the authors present some evidence on a negative
relationship between ethnic diversity and under-investment in schooling, weak financial institutions,
poor infrastructure and black-market premia.
Collier (1998) cautions that the relationship between ethnicity and economic performance is
more complex and contextual than this. While arguing that ethnic diversity can become a drag on
growth, Collier adds the proviso that the negative effects are largely confined to economies with
limited individual rights. In fact, ethnic diversity can be a plus. While democratic institutions
can effectively mitigate the negative effects of ethnic diversity, highly diverse countries are less
likely (not more likely) to break out into ethnic conflict, presumably because of the higher cost of
inter-ethnic cooperation. Bates (2008) contextualizes the impact of ethnicity in a similar way. He
argues that the predatory nature of the post-colonial state in many African countries created political
and military challenges to its authority. When the challenges intensified, ethnic stratification also
intensified to the point where “things fell apart.”
The literature on ethnic conflict tends to assume that the oppositional character of ethnic identity,
with its insider-outsider distinctions, is a source of conflict that impedes growth. A useful alternative
view is offered by Esteban and Ray (2008). In situations where political behavior can be modeled
as “prize grabbing” mass mobilization, there is a built-in bias towards ethnic rather than class
mobilization because ethnic groups include the rich, who have the resources, and the poor, who
provide the labor needed to mount a mass movement. Conflict will tend to occur along ethnic
lines, not because ethnic identity is inherently conflictual but because it is easier to mount an
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ethnically-based mass movement.
In all of these examples ethnicity is treated as exogenous and given to the situation. In fact,
Collier (1998) expresses an uneasiness about the negative connotations being attached to ethnic
diversity in Africa because “... there is nothing a country can legitimately do about its ethnic
composition.” But there is a large and growing literature which attempts to endogenize ethnic
identity, to varying degrees. This literature tends to emphasize the fact that people have multiple
identities that are malleable, politically manipulable and situational. Posner (2005), for example,
develops and tests a model explicitly designed to identify the conditions under which individual
Zambians choose to organize around one particular identity rather than another. Individuals are
viewed as having a portfolio of identities from which they can choose, and it is postulated that
individuals choose the one that has the best chances of putting them in the winning coalition. The
important political choice in post-colonial Zambia is between ethnic identity and language identity,
and Posner is successful in revealing the conditions under which people choose one or the other.
Still, in this formulation ethnic identity as distinct from language identity retains a high degree of
exogeniety. The choice is between ethnic and language identity, not between competing ethnic
identities.
Ethnic identity becomes more endogenous and malleable when one leaves the realm of rational
choice and takes a historical view. Posner (2005), for example, spends two chapters tracing the
historical origins of Zambia’s ethnic and language groupings. The conventional wisdom here
emphasizes the role played by the institutions of colonial rule, not the conflict and violence of the
slave trade. Quoting Posner,
“In tracing the origins of contemporary Zambian ethnic identity to the institutions of
colonial rule, I am following an extremely well-trodden path. In fact, the notion that the
colonial state created or heightened the importance of ethnic identities in post-colonial
Africa is so accepted these days that to argue otherwise would probably be controversial
(2006 page 23).”
Yet otherwise is precisely what we want to argue. The conventional view roots the salience of
ethnic identity in Africa in what Firmin-Sellers (1996) calls “the logic of indirect rule.” Colonial
administrations, befuddled by the variety of local ethnic political economies they encountered,
found it difficult to extract economic surplus directly. In situations like this, characterized by
asymmetric information, the principal (the colonial power) has an incentive to share the surplus
with agents (indigenous authorities) who know how to monitor and direct the production and flow
of surplus to the top. The colonial power stood behind and strengthened the indigenous territorial
authorities, often drawing maps to clearly delineate boundaries. Posner (2005) argues that the logic
of indirect rule also provided incentives for local inhabitants to identify with the prevailing social
prescriptions that legitimize the local authority. It is through this identity – this ethnic identity – that
local inhabitants gained access to important public goods.
This view is plausible and well-documented. The point we want to make in this chapter is
that the slave trade helped shape the ethnic landscape that the colonial powers encountered in
Africa. We are not trying to overturn the conventional wisdom, but to root it more firmly in the
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history of Africa. In fact, we use the many maps of ethnic boundaries drawn by colonial authorities
to construct our measure of ethnic diversity across the African landscape. We then ask did the
intensity of past slaving activities influence this ethnic landscape? Our prior is that the slave trade
influenced the spatial distribution of political authority and the salience of ethnic identity. The idea
is straightforward. When the international demand for Africans as slaves penetrates an area of
Africa it drives the marginal value of people as captives above their marginal value as producers to
be taxed. Consequently, increases in demand price reduce the incentives to build states and increases
the incentive to raid for slaves. The immediate effect is smaller states and a greater number of
independent villages. To the extent that there exist prohibitions against enslaving one’s own, then an
increase in demand price will also intensify the incentive to produce “outsiders” who can be raided.
Finally, to the extent that local political authority is absolutist, increases in demand price will also
reduce the incentive to build coalitions across villages to defend against slave raiders. All of these
forces contribute to a greater degree of ethnic diversity across the African landscape. We believe
that recognition of a history of slaving in Africa can help explain the salience of ethnic identity
among African people, the great diversity of ethnic identities on the continent of Africa, the spatial
distribution of ethnic authorities, and the conflictual nature of some ethnic relations.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
In order to determine the impact of the transatlantic slave trade on the long-run development of
ethnicity in Africa, we compare the number of ethnicities in equally sized regions along the West
African coast with the number of slaves that departed from these regions. Our basic strategy is
as follows. We divide the western coast of Africa into 200 evenly spaced points starting at the
northernmost point of Tunisia and ending at the middle of South Africa. The distance between
points is 50 kilometres. Both the dependent and independent variables are constructed from spatial
data that fall within circular buffer zones around these points. Our dependent variable is the number
of ethnicities in the region around each coastal point. The spatial ethno-linguistic data is taken from
the digitized Peoples Atlas compiled by Felix and Meur (2001). It is our understanding that this is
the most modern Africa-wide ethno-linguistic classification map available. For robustness, we also
use the ethno-linguistic mapping of Africa developed by Murdock (1959). This is not our preferred
measure because it stifles much of the variation found in more-modern mappings and appears to
group sub-ethnicities together. Our independent variables include the number of slaves exported
from nearby African ports, courtesy of the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database,1 soil and terrain
slope constraints, population density in 1960,2 elevation,3 local agricultural suitability as measured
by climate, forest coverage, and desert coverage.4
1Eltis, David. The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. http://www.slavevoyages.org (accessed October 1, 2010)
2UNESCO. UNEP Sioux Falls Clearninghouse http://na.unep.net/datasets/datalist.php (accessed October 1, 2010)
3USGS. USGS Geographic Data Download http://edc2.usgs.gov/geodata/index.php. (accessed October 1, 2010)
4IIASA Global Agro-Ecological Assessment for Agriculture in the 21st Century: Methodology and Results.
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm (accessed October 1, 2010)
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We perform our regression analysis with 3 different circular buffer sizes: 125 kilometres, 250
kilometres, and 500 kilometres in radius. In our analysis using the 125 kilometre buffer our envi-
ronmental variables are based on their mean value in that region, the number of ethnicities is the
total number found within that buffer, and slave exports are the total exported from slaving ports
falling within that buffer. In addition to the buffer method, we perform our analysis assigning each
ethnicity to the nearest of the coastal points. Using each of these methods, we perform the following
OLS regression:
Ei = α+β1Si + γXi + vi
Where Ei is the number of ethnicities assigned to coastal point i, α is the intercept, Si is the
number of slave exports assigned to coastal point i, Xi is a vector of environmental covariates
assigned to coastal point i, and vi is an error term.
There is almost certainly some degree of reverse causation in the above specifications. If slaving
was taboo within one’s own ethnic group it would have been necessary for other ethnicities to be
present nearby in order to capture slaves. In order to present a causal estimate of the impact of
slaving on the development of ethnicity, we make use of the instruments developed by Nunn (2008a)
which in this analysis are the distances between the coastal points and the nearest slave destination
in the Americas or North Africa.5
The circular buffer zones overlap along the coast, but they have the virtue of encompassing
much interior territory. To ensure the robustness of the results, we take steps to reduce overlap.
We draw buffers around every other coastal point (resulting in 100 buffer zones) and every fourth
(producing 50 buffer zones). We also perform our analysis on a set of buffer zones that are just
tangent to each other, with no overlap. This produces 67, 40 and 19 zones respectively for the
125km, 250km and 500km buffers.
4.4 Results
In Table 1 we present results from several of the OLS and 2SLS regression specifications. The
complete set of OLS and first and second stage 2SLS results for both of our ethnicity measures are
available in the Appendix.
Columns 2 and 3 contain a subset of our OLS results, using both the Peoples Atlas and Murdock
measures of ethnicity to generate our outcome variables. It is clear that there is a robust, positive
relationship between slave exports and the number of ethnicities as defined by the Peoples Atlas.
Among the controls, agricultural suitability and population are positively related to the number
of ethnicities while elevation, forest, and desert cover are all negatively related to the number of
ethnicities. The positive relationship between slave exports and ethnicity tends to persist using
5The American destinations are Virginia, Havana, Haiti, Kingston, Dominica, Guyana, Salvador, Rio de Janeiro,
and the North African destinations are Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Bengahzi, Cairo.
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the Murdock (1959) measure, although it is a weaker relationship than with the Peoples Atlas. In
general, the results are stronger the larger the buffer zone and the greater the number of observations.
Type OLS OLS IV IV OLS IV
P - 125km 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.008 0.026
P - 250km 0.041∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.153∗∗
P - 500km 0.160∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.141 0.315∗∗
P- Nearest 0.025∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
M - 125km −0.0004 −0.0007 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗
M - 250km 0.003∗∗ 0.002 0.0006 0.002
M- 500km 0.019∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
M- Nearest 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.007 0.006∗∗∗
Obs 200 100 200 100 67,40,19 67,40,19
Table 4.1 The results presented in this table are calculated using OLS or 2SLS. The variables are constructed
in a buffer around the coastal observation points as specified in the type column. The ‘P’ measure of ethnicity
is constructed using the Peoples Atlas in Felix and Meur (2001) while the ‘M’ measure is constructed from
Murdock (1959).
In columns 4 and 5, we display the coefficient on slave exports from our IV regressions. As
in the OLS regressions, there exists a strong positive relationship between slave exports and the
number of ethnicities in each region. The treatment effects are significantly larger in specifications
using the Peoples Atlas and only slightly larger in specifications using Murdock’s mapping. The
results from the first stage of the regressions are available in the online Appendix. The instrument is
powerful and the strategy does not appear to suffer from a weak instruments problem.
The results are robust for all buffer sizes and numbers of observations for the Peoples Atlas.
The Murdock results are generally robust, although weaker for smaller buffer zones. The results are
robust to removing most observations from North Africa and South Africa. In columns 6 and 7, we
present results using the Peoples Atlas where buffer zones are not allowed to overlap. As such, we
have 67, 40, and 19 observations respectively. The downside to limiting the level of overlap is that
we are unable to take advantage of much of the inland variation in ethnicity. These specifications
provide results that are positive and are statistically significant in half of the specifications. The
results are robust to performing the analysis at the country-level.
To get an idea of the size of the treatment effect, we multiply the coefficients by mean slave
exports. The small buffer zone estimates, using the Peoples Atlas, indicate that the slave trade
resulted in an average increase of 0.9 to 2.3 ethnicities in each of the 200 regions. This should be
viewed as a lower bound on the treatment effect. The larger buffer zone estimates, using the Peoples
Atlas, suggest an average local increase (over a much larger area) of 43.6 to 110.95 ethnicities.
Since ethnicities overlap across buffer zones this overstates the treatment effect. This should be
viewed as an upper bound on the treatment effect. For reference, the Peoples Atlas contains roughly
3700 ethnicities for all of Africa. It is difficult to determine a precise treatment effect, but it is clear
that the effect is economically significant even at the lower bound.
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4.5 A Model of War and Raiding
Given these large treatment effects, it is important to ask what exactly in the behaviour of people
living in Africa or their states may have resulted in such a large increase in ethnicities as a result of
the trade in human beings. To this end, we develop a simple model of village and state behaviour that
hints at the dynamic that could be driving the empirical results. It is a simple model of cooperation
and conflict between nations and villages. The model reveals the conditions under which the slave
trade reduced the size of states and increased social and ethnic stratification.
The model is simple, but generates powerful results and insights. The players are the rulers of
nations and villages who interact over an infinite time horizon in sequential play. We make this
assumption because the slave trade lasted for centuries. Nations have the ability to attack villages to
either conquer them or raid for slaves, but nations are unable to attack other nations. We define war
as aggression for the purpose of acquiring people and territory (state-building). We define raiding
as aggression for the purpose of acquiring people only (for the slave trade). Nations may decide to
go to war, to raid or to do nothing. Villages may form defensive alliances against aggressive nations
or offensive alliances, but there is a penalty for doing so. It reflects either the loss of independence
or the cost of cooperating with outsiders. If a defensive alliance is formed the villages may not be
attacked by a nation. If an offensive alliance is formed the alliance-villages may raid non-alliance
villages. Villages may also choose to do nothing.
We assume that villages and nations are absolutist in the sense that the community leaders
(elders, chiefs or kings) have the absolute authority to make decision for the people when it comes
to war or raiding, and that this authority derives from the elite’s claim to land, be it legitimized by
oral history, lineage or religion.6 The assumption of absolutism has several important implications.
First, decisions are made to maximize the elites’ utility, not the people’s utility. These are not
democracies. Second, if the land of a village is captured in a war then the victor claims his right to
the land by deposing of the elite. In other words, the chief is beheaded. Raiding is for bodies but
war is for heads.
Finally, we assume diminishing returns to war and constant return to slave raiding, but the results
hold so long as the returns to raiding decline slower than the returns to war. This is a reasonable
assumption because the territory accumulated in war must be protected from outside aggressors. It
must be policed and administered internally. Taxes must be collected. Communications networks
and roads must be built and maintained. Rebellions in the outer provinces must be put down. The
marginal cost of maintaining state territory obviously increases with the size of the territory.7
Raiding, on the other hand, is hit-and-run. There is no need to deploy an occupying force or
construct infrastructure. Diminishing returns may set in as populations migrate to avoid raiders, or
6Again, the best description is offered by Equiano: “When a trader wants slaves, he applies to a chief for them, and
tempts him with his wares. It is not extraordinary, if on this occasion he yields to the temptation with a little firmness,
and accepts the price of his fellow creatures’ liberty, with as little reluctance as the enlightened merchant. Accordingly
he falls on his neighbor, and a desperate battle ensues.” (Equiano, 1794)
7See Wilks (1975), chapters 1-4 for a discussion of the enormous effort to build and maintain the Great Roads of
Asante, and the administrative and communication cost of ruling the Asante empire.
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victims may adopt other defensive strategies.8 However, it is unlikely that traveling 50 miles further
inland to raid for slaves adds more to the cost of acquiring surplus than does defending, integrating
and administering a political outpost that is 50 miles further inland.
The complete assumptions for the model are listed in the Appendix. In the following three
subsections we present the predictions generated by the model under different scenarios in the
presence and absence international demand for slaves. The first scenario is the simplest and includes
a single nation and a single village. In scenario two, we extend the first scenario to a single nation
and many villages with a high alliance formation penalty. The third scenario includes a single nation
and several villages with a low alliance formation penalty.
4.5.1 Scenario One: One Nation and One Village
In our first scenario, we consider the most basic possible situation in which international demand
for slaves influences the behavior of an African state. In this scenario, there is a single nation and
a single village which share a common border. We define the nation’s labor force as Ln and the
village’s labor force as L1. We also define the nation’s labor productivity as bn and the village’s
labor productivity as b1. We have defined the ruler’s utility function to be logarithmic in produced
goods (where the value of produced goods in each region is labor productivity times the regional
labor force) minus a fixed cost if aggressive action is undertaken (X is the cost of war, which is
greater than S, the cost of slave raiding) plus an additional term paLi if slaves are captured, which
is revenue from slaves captured. Thus, the lifetime utility function if a nation does nothing in all
periods, raids in all periods, or goes to war in the first period (and then does nothing) is as follows:
U(Nothing) =
log(bnLn)
1−δ (4.1)
U(Raiding) =
log(bnLn)−R+ paL1
1−δ (4.2)
U(Conquest) =
log(bnLn +b1L1)
1−δ −X (4.3)
In the absence of international demand for slaves, which we represent as a slave price equal
to zero (p = 0)9 there exist two possible outcomes in equilibrium: the nation may either conquer
the village in the first period or choose to take no aggressive action and simply produce goods.
The nation will never choose to conquer the village after the first period because it faces the same
payoff decision in each period. To determine whether the nation will choose to conquer the village
8See the collection of articles in Diouf (2003) for examples of defensive strategies including: relocating in swamps,
abandoning villages, changing crops, changing architecture, building walls around cities and organizing local militia
and defensive alliances among villages.
9Or, in other words, there is no external market for slaves. Thus, it may be appropriate to think of this model as
before and after the beginning of the international slave trade. Instead of a starting slave price of zero, the results are
identical if, in the absence of effective demand, paL1 < R and in its presence paL1 > R
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or simply produce, we compare the lifetime utility derived by the rulers of the nation in the two
situations (conquering the village versus producing). The nation will choose to conquer the village
if the lifetime utility obtained by conquest is greater than that obtained through production:
U(Conquest)≥U(Production)
log(bnLn +b1L1)
1−δ −X ≥
log(bnLn)
1−δ . (4.4)
Thus, the nation will conquer the village if the one-time cost of conquest, which we define as
X , is less than the discounted lifetime utility added through conquest (meaning that there is a net
benefit to war):
X ≤ log(bnLn +b1L1)
1−δ −
log(Ln)
1−δ . (4.5)
As long as there is a net benefit to war, the nation will choose to conquer the village in the first
period. This results in an increase in the size of the nation, as it incorporates the village. If the
inequality does not hold (meaning that there is not a net benefit to war), the nation will do nothing
and a peaceful equilibrium will be maintained.
If we introduce a positive price for slaves into the above scenario the equilibrium may be altered
if there is a net benefit to slave raiding (paL1 ≥ R), meaning that the return to raiding is greater
than the costs. If we start from a peaceful equilibrium any positive net benefit to slave raiding
will generate a new slave raiding equilibrium. What does this change relative to the situation in
the absence of international demand? First, it results in increased slave capture and the associated
culture of terror. Second, it results in a permanent reallocation of labor from production to slave
raiding. If we start from the conquest equilibrium, international demand for slaves will alter the
equilibrium if the lifetime utility for the ruler is greater under slave raiding than under conquest,
meaning that:
U(Raiding)≥U(Conquest)
log(bnLn)−R+ paL1
1−δ ≥
log(bnLn +b1L1)
1−δ −X . (4.6)
If this inequality holds, the equilibrium will be altered such that the nation will choose to raid
the village in each period.
Thus, for a sufficiently large value of paL1 (the return to slave raiding) or sufficiently small
values of R (the cost of slave raiding) the war equilibrium will be disrupted and replaced with a
raiding equilibrium. What are the consequences? In addition to the effects previously noted in the
perturbation of the peaceful equilibrium (labor reallocation and more slaves captured) there are
implications for ethnicity and state size. The village and the nation both survive in equilibrium with
84
the nation being smaller than it was in the absence of effective demand. Since the village persists,
this may be viewed as an increase in ethnic diversity in the long run.
4.5.2 Scenario Two: One Nation and Many Villages
The second scenario generalizes the first scenario to a situation with a large number of villages
and a single nation. We assume that there are a total of N villages and a single nation. To keep the
scenario simple, we assume that the penalty to forming an alliance (amongst the villages) is large
enough to deter alliance formation. Additionally, we assume that the size of the labor force for both
villages and the nation is equal to L and that regional labor productivity is equal to b. As in the first
scenario, we assume that, in the absence of international demand for slaves, the price for slaves is
zero. The utility functions for the nation and villages are characterized as they were previously.
In the absence of international demand, the nation will choose to conquer at least one village if
the ruler’s lifetime utility associated with the conquest of a village is greater than his utility when no
villages are conquered. The nation, however, may conquer more than a single village, although we
assume that it is only able to conquer one village each period. The nation will continue conquering
villages until the marginal lifetime benefit of conquering another village is less than the one-time
penalty associated with war (X). We may use this condition to define the total number of villages
conquered (n) in equilibrium. The nation will conquer villages as long as the marginal benefit of
conquest is greater than the marginal cost. The nation will continue conquering villages as long as
the below inequality holds, where X is the marginal cost of conquering one more villages and the
right term is the marginal benefit of conquering 1 more village (the benefit of conquering n villages
- the benefit of conquering n−1 villages):
X ≤ log(nbL)
1−δ −
log((n−1)bL)
1−δ (4.7)
Thus, the nation conquers n villages where n is the largest value such that the above inequality
holds. Under optimizing behavior, the nation achieves a size of nL while the number of independent
villages in equilibrium is reduced to N−n.
If we introduce international demand into the scenario the equilibrium condition will be altered.
Assuming that N is a very large number (meaning that it is implausible for the nation to conquer all
villages), the marginal condition now includes the opportunity cost of not raiding for the period in
which the final village is conquered (meaning that had the nation chosen to not go to war it would
have had the option to raid for slaves). Thus, the nation will now conquer villages as long as the
marginal cost of war is less than the marginal benefit (this inequality closely mirrors the previous
inequality):
X−R+ paL≤ log(nbL)
1−δ −
log((n−1)bL)
1−δ (4.8)
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As before, the above condition determines the number of villages that are conquered in equi-
librium, n. If there is a net benefit to raiding it is necessarily the case that the size of the nation
will be smaller than in the absence of international demand: the left hand term is greater than it
was before the slave trade arrived. The effects are similar to those presented in the first scenario.
Nations will generally be smaller in equilibrium and greater ethnic diversity will persist. Again,
there is a permanent reallocation of labor rather than a temporary one, as war occurred over a finite
number of periods while raiding occurs indefinitely. Furthermore, if we imagine a continuum of
nations playing this game, an increase in the price of slaves will produce more raiding. Thus, this
simple model can generate an upward sloping supply curve.
As an extension, we may imagine this scenario with the villages and the nation located spatially
along a line that runs from the African coast towards the interior. We may then contrast cases in
which the nation is located (at the start of the game) either adjacent to the coast or deep within the
interior. When a nation located along the coast conquers villages, it will be expanding towards the
interior. When an interior nation conquers villages it pushes towards the coast. This scenario is
interesting if we assume that prices vary by village according to their proximity to the coast, slave
prices being higher the closer a village is to the coast. For example, if, in equilibrium, the nation
raids a village near to the coast the return is higher than if it raids a village deep in the interior. For
a nation in the interior, this pricing situation translates into a lower opportunity cost of war for any
value of n (where n is the number of villages conquered) relative to a nation on the coast. This
is true because the price of slaves for a village in the interior is lower than the price of slaves for
a village near the coast. Additionally, the nation in the interior has an incentive to push towards
the coast as it will a result in a higher slave price when it decides to halt conquest and begin slave
raiding. The coastal nation has the exact opposite incentives. Thus, the introduction of a price
gradient discourages expansion for coastal nations and encourages expansion towards the coast for
interior nations.
4.5.3 Scenario Three: One Nation and Three Villages with the Possibility of
Alliances
In our third and final scenario, we suppose that we are in a situation with a single nation and three
villages arranged along a line with the nation at one end. We again assume that the nation and all
villages have the same population L and regional labor productivity b. Unlike scenario two, we
assume that the penalty for alliance formation is not so large that it necessarily rules out alliance
formation. Thus, we will need to examine villages’ alliance decisions.
We start by assuming that, in the absence of international demand, the parameters of the model
are such that the nation will conquer all three villages. In other words, the utility increase from
conquering the third village must be greater than the conquest penalty. Thus, all three villages are
conquered if the marginal benefit of conquest is greater than the marginal cost:
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X ≤ log(4bL)
1−δ −
log(3bL)
1−δ (4.9)
As long as this inequality holds, the nation will conquer all three villages. However, it is possible
that the villages may choose to voluntarily form an alliance. In order to determine whether this
occurs, we must compare the utility of the village rulers if they are conquered with their utility if
they form a defensive alliance. If no villages form an alliance and they are all conquered, the rulers
of the villages will have utility as follows, where village 1 is the village next to the nation, village 2
is next on the line, followed by village 3:
U1 = 0 (4.10)
U2 = log(bL) (4.11)
U3 = log(bL)+δ log(bL) = (1+δ )log(bL) (4.12)
Since the nation is only able to conquer a single village in each period, the third village is in the
“best” situation of the three. The only possibility for alliance formation is a joining of villages two
and three, as we assume that the nation gets to play first in the sequential game. Since village three
has a higher utility if no alliance is formed, the binding constraint for alliance formation falls on
village three.
Village three will voluntarily enter into an alliance with village two if the utility from the alliance
is greater than remaining independent and being conquered. Thus, villages two and three form an
alliance if the discounted continuous utility stream provided by survival is greater than the utility
from independence and being conquered:
log(bL)− ε
1−δ ≥ (1+δ )Log(bL) (4.13)
If the alliance penalty is greater than δ 2log(bL) village three will not enter into an alliance with
village two, resulting in an equilibrium in which the nation conquers all three villages.
If we assume that the alliance penalty is indeed large enough to prevent alliance formation the
introduction of international demand will alter the equilibrium outcome in a particular manner. With
a positive slave price, the nation only desires to conquer all three villages if the persistent value
of conquering the first and the second villages is greater than the opportunity cost (not raiding for
slaves in each period) of war and the value to conquering the third village is greater than the value
of raiding the third village for all remaining periods. This reduces to the second scenario in which
there is less conquest, greater ethnic diversity, a permanent reallocation of labor, and more slaves
produced.
If the penalty for alliance formation is sufficiently low villages two and three may choose to
form an alliance in the presence of international demand. If we assume that the parameters of
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the model are such that the nation conquers village one (in the event that villages two and three
ally) villages two and three will form an alliance if the utility to allying for village three is greater
than remaining independent (but being raided forever). This may be expressed as the following
inequality:
log(bL)−S
1−δ ≤
log(bL)− ε
1−δ (4.14)
Thus, it is apparent that our equilibrium condition for alliance formation is different than it was
in the absence of international demand. If we imagine a certain distribution over values of S, it is
now more likely that village three will not make an offer of alliance to village two. This is a result
of our assumption of an absolutist state governed in the sole interests of the nation’s (or village’s)
ruler. The logic is that the ruling elite in village three will maintain their status while their village is
raided, but would lose that status (and perhaps their lives) if conquered. Thus, in this scenario, the
introduction of effective demand decreases state size, as village three is not conquered and results
in a long term reallocation of labor from productive purposes towards raiding. Ethnic diversity is
also greater and persists.10
All three scenarios suggest several stylized facts. International demand for slaves (or an increase
in slave prices) should produce smaller states with more slave raiding, greater ethnic diversity and
more alliances for the purpose of raiding. International demand (or price increases) should also
result in fewer defensive alliances and decreased production. Increases in the productivity of labor
10Finally, in a permutation of scenario three, we may consider another possible equilibrium in which villages two
and three form an alliance (and the nation does not conquer village one) in order to raid the remaining village. This
occurs if the value of conquest (of village one) for the nation is less than the value of raiding that village forever:
log(bL)+ paL−R
1−δ ≥
log(2bL)
1−δ −X (4.15)
The necessary constraint on villages 2 and 3 to form an alliance is altered such that they will only form an alliance if
the benefit to allying (and then subsequently raiding village 1) is greater than remaining independent:
log(L)− ε−R+ paL
1−δ ≥
log(L)
1−δ (4.16)
Additionally, it must be the case that they do not wish to conquer village one. They do not conquer village one if
the utiltiy provided by raiding village one forever is greater than conquering the village and then doing nothing for all
future periods:
log(L)− ε−R+ paL
1−δ ≥
log(1.5L)− ε
1−δ −X (4.17)
If these inequalities hold we have an equilibrium in which the nation raids village one, and villages two and three
form an alliance which in turn raids village one. This outcome is more likely to occur for larger values of p and, as
such, helps generate an upward sloping supply curve. In addition, it generates greater ethnic diversity and smaller states.
Again, there is a significant reallocation of labor from productive purposes.
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should increase state building (and as such, decrease raiding and ethnic diversity).
The model and the three scenarios clearly present a plausible explanation for the empirical
results in which international demand for slaves may have fundamentally altered the behaviour of
African states and villages. It may have discouraged nation building and, rather resulted in a drastic
increase in the number of autonomous states and villages over time. If we believe that distinct
ethnicities, one conquered will tend to merge with other ethnicities in the same political unit, this
effect would then lead to an increase in ethnicity over time. This is not to say that the effect could
not be driven by other mechanisms. For example, we know that the slave trade had permanent
impacts on trust and mistrust. This may have discouraged cultures from growing together over time
perhaps as a result of less co-mingling.
4.6 Conclusion
We have argued that the slave trade increased the number of ethnic groupings in present-day Africa.
We do not claim to understand the mechanism with certainty, although we believe that the slave trade
likely fundamentally altered the behaviour of states in a manner that constrained the geographic
scope of political authority. This effect likely played in tandem with growing mistrust and increased
incentives to distinguish insider from outsider. Our regressions identify a positive and statistically
significant relationship between the number of slaves leaving the west coast of Africa and the limited
geographic scope of twentieth century ethnic groupings. This relationship is robust to changes in the
scheme for drawing ethnic boundaries, to the choice of observational unit, and to the inclusion of a
variety of variables thought to influence the geographic scope of ethnic groupings. Our IV estimates
produce support for the view that causality runs from slaving to ethnic diversity. We believe this
finding has broad implications for research in the economic history of Africa.
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) find that the intensity of slave capturing and marketing in the
past helps explain spatial and individual variation in the level of mistrust among Africans today.
Coupled with the evidence on ethnic conflict, one might expect mistrust to be one of the many social
manifestations of the kind of heightened ethnic identity that we find correlated with the slave trade.
At the most general level, our findings endogenize some of the ethnic diversity that characterizes
contemporary Africa. Rather than view the salience of ethnic identity in Africa as something
primordial, traditional, or even primitive, this paper presents evidence that it is the exact opposite
– a legacy of the role and position of Africa in the creation of our modern world. At the same
time, it is consistent with the view that ethnic diversity has roots in Africa that run deeper than the
colonial experience. This may help explain why colonial powers often chose indirect rule and the
strengthening of “traditional” authority. The plethora of moral ethnicities surviving the slave trade
may have constrained the importation of European institutions. Daron Acemoglu and Robinson
(2001) might see this as a reversal of fortune.11 In this case, the extractive institution is organized
slave raiding, which Nunn (2008a) argues is not conducive to long-run growth. What we add to this
11See Daron Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) for further context.
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line of thinking is a lock-in mechanism – ethnic diversity – which locks-out the importation of an
alternative set of institutions that may have been more favorable to long-run growth (Lange, 2004),
while locking-in the beneficiaries of slave raiding.
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4.7 Appendix: Tables
Felix & Meur (2001) - Number of Ethnicities in 125km Buffers
IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Slaves .021 .020 .022 .015 .013 .014 .038 .038 .041
(.004)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗ (.026)
AgSuitability 3.647 3.541 3.335 3.431 3.325 3.681
(.653)∗∗∗ (.900)∗∗∗ (1.311)∗∗ (.737)∗∗∗ (1.037)∗∗∗ (1.546)∗∗
Population .076 .066 .080 .056 .046 .077
(.026)∗∗∗ (.034)∗ (.041)∗ (.031)∗ (.041) (.048)
Elevation -.087 -.194 -.548 .080 .004 -.346
(.115) (.166) (.254)∗∗ (.153) (.230) (.348)
Forest -7.444 -5.744 -7.499 -7.741 -3.860 -12.427
(5.355) (7.178) (10.893) (5.984) (8.283) (13.382)
Desert -15.247 -15.238 -13.652 -12.314 -11.954 -11.439
(2.351)∗∗∗ (3.372)∗∗∗ (4.932)∗∗∗ (3.010)∗∗∗ (4.420)∗∗∗ (6.053)∗
Obs. 200 100 50 200 100 50 200 100 50
Table 4.2 The results presented in this table are calculated using OLS or 2SLS, as marked. The variables
are constructed in a 125km buffer around each of the coastal points. Specifications include totals of: 50, 100,
and 200 total points. The measure of ethnicity is constructed using Felix and Meur (2001).
91
Felix & Meur (2001) - Number of Ethnicities in 250km Buffers
IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Slaves .072 .072 .078 .041 .042 .028 .123 .120 .141
(.008)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.015)∗ (.028)∗∗∗ (.035)∗∗∗ (.061)∗∗
AgSuitability 10.387 9.939 7.871 6.436 6.310 .356
(1.937)∗∗∗ (2.710)∗∗∗ (3.993)∗∗ (2.806)∗∗ (3.785)∗ (7.062)
Population .885 .909 1.209 .680 .631 .838
(.100)∗∗∗ (.154)∗∗∗ (.221)∗∗∗ (.145)∗∗∗ (.228)∗∗∗ (.379)∗∗
Elevation -.800 -.799 -1.067 -.165 -.073 .103
(.267)∗∗∗ (.386)∗∗ (.525)∗∗ (.401) (.580) (.979)
Forest -12.314 -6.817 5.105 -25.222 -19.858 -3.351
(6.793)∗ (9.282) (14.779) (9.706)∗∗∗ (13.071) (22.531)
Desert -17.295 -15.296 -14.335 -5.867 -5.739 4.425
(3.432)∗∗∗ (4.402)∗∗∗ (8.285)∗ (5.767) (6.905) (15.554)
Obs. 200 100 50 200 100 50 200 100 50
Table 4.3 The results presented in this table are calculated using OLS or 2SLS, as marked. The variables
are constructed in a 250km buffer around each of the coastal points. Specifications include totals of: 50, 100,
and 200 total points. The measure of ethnicity is constructed using Felix and Meur (2001).
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Felix & Meur (2001) - Number of Ethnicities in 500km Buffers
IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Slaves .169 .173 .179 .160 .166 .170 .342 .353 .407
(.012)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗ (.036)∗∗∗ (.053)∗∗∗ (.074)∗∗∗ (.207)∗∗
AgSuitability 3.205 -2.238 1.948 -20.801 -20.906 -39.345
(5.724) (7.580) (14.707) (9.983)∗∗ (12.388)∗ (40.693)
Population 4.369 4.612 4.850 3.419 3.462 4.602
(.488)∗∗∗ (.688)∗∗∗ (1.265)∗∗∗ (.699)∗∗∗ (1.027)∗∗∗ (1.804)∗∗
Elevation -.338 -.022 -.170 2.830 2.947 3.315
(.836) (1.173) (1.767) (1.401)∗∗ (1.934) (3.869)
Forest -53.943 -43.352 -61.010 -119.394 -114.883 -124.344
(10.754)∗∗∗ (14.784)∗∗∗ (24.603)∗∗ (22.658)∗∗∗ (33.058)∗∗∗ (63.946)∗
Desert -10.985 -5.510 -16.737 12.465 12.459 33.437
(4.043)∗∗∗ (4.542) (13.956) (8.281) (9.036) (46.850)
Obs. 200 100 50 200 100 50 200 100 50
Table 4.4 The results presented in this table are calculated using OLS or 2SLS, as marked. The variables
are constructed in a 500km buffer around each of the coastal points. Specifications include totals of: 50, 100,
and 200 total points. The measure of ethnicity is constructed using Felix and Meur (2001).
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Felix & Meur (2001) - Number of Ethnicities (Assigned to Nearest Coastal Point)
IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Slaves .028 .019 .024 .025 .018 .009 .059 .047 .068
(.007)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.008) (.028)∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.050)
AgSuitability 3.674 .437 6.903 -.792 -2.534 -3.456
(3.889) (1.733) (3.422)∗∗ (5.233) (2.473) (9.847)
Population .560 .537 1.026 .383 .354 .963
(.331)∗ (.157)∗∗∗ (.294)∗∗∗ (.366) (.205)∗ (.436)∗∗
Elevation .054 .126 -.204 .644 .599 .671
(.568) (.268) (.411) (.734) (.386) (.936)
Forest -8.257 -.749 -7.815 -20.431 -12.134 -23.704
(7.306) (3.381) (5.725) (11.877)∗ (6.600)∗ (15.474)
Desert -2.688 .416 -7.952 1.674 3.275 4.636
(2.747) (1.039) (3.248)∗∗ (4.341) (1.804)∗ (11.337)
Obs. 200 100 50 200 100 50 200 100 50
Table 4.5 The results presented in this table are calculated using OLS or 2SLS, as marked. The environ-
mental variables are constructed in a 500km buffer around each of the coastal points. Ethnicities are only
assigned to the nearest coastal point. Specifications include totals of: 50, 100, and 200 total points. The
measure of ethnicity is constructed using Felix and Meur (2001).
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Murdock (1959) - Number of Ethnicities in 125km Buffers
IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Slaves .001 .001 .002 -.0004 -.0007 -.0002 -.001 -.001 -.0009
(.0007)∗ (.001) (.001) (.0006) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.003) (.005)
AgSuitability .452 .595 .463 .457 .600 .454
(.127)∗∗∗ (.189)∗∗∗ (.267)∗ (.128)∗∗∗ (.191)∗∗∗ (.274)∗
Population .009 .012 .015 .009 .013 .016
(.005)∗ (.007)∗ (.008)∗ (.005)∗ (.008)∗ (.008)∗
Elevation -.049 -.079 -.077 -.053 -.083 -.083
(.022)∗∗ (.035)∗∗ (.052) (.027)∗∗ (.042)∗ (.062)
Forest 1.891 1.470 .040 1.898 1.430 .173
(1.041)∗ (1.503) (2.218) (1.043)∗ (1.523) (2.370)
Desert -2.485 -2.883 -2.496 -2.558 -2.952 -2.556
(.457)∗∗∗ (.706)∗∗∗ (1.004)∗∗ (.525)∗∗∗ (.813)∗∗∗ (1.072)∗∗
Obs. 200 100 50 200 100 50 200 100 50
Table 4.6 The results presented in this table are calculated using OLS or 2SLS, as marked. The variables
are constructed in a 125km buffer around each of the coastal points. Specifications include totals of: 50, 100,
and 200 total points. The measure of ethnicity is constructed using Murdock (1959).
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Murdock (1959) - Number of Ethnicities in 250km Buffers
IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Slaves .009 .009 .009 .003 .002 -.0008 .0006 .002 -.003
(.001)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.002) (.002) (.003) (.004) (.006)
AgSuitability 1.809 1.780 2.132 1.904 1.822 2.258
(.286)∗∗∗ (.417)∗∗∗ (.592)∗∗∗ (.325)∗∗∗ (.456)∗∗∗ (.705)∗∗∗
Population .127 .128 .147 .132 .132 .154
(.015)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.033)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗ (.038)∗∗∗
Elevation -.182 -.192 -.253 -.197 -.201 -.272
(.039)∗∗∗ (.060)∗∗∗ (.078)∗∗∗ (.046)∗∗∗ (.070)∗∗∗ (.098)∗∗∗
Forest -.685 .173 1.182 -.374 .324 1.324
(1.004) (1.430) (2.193) (1.122) (1.576) (2.250)
Desert -3.363 -3.107 -4.068 -3.639 -3.218 -4.384
(.507)∗∗∗ (.678)∗∗∗ (1.229)∗∗∗ (.667)∗∗∗ (.832)∗∗∗ (1.553)∗∗∗
Obs. 200 100 50 200 100 50 200 100 50
Table 4.7 The results presented in this table are calculated using OLS or 2SLS, as marked. The variables
are constructed in a 250km buffer around each of the coastal points. Specifications include totals of: 50, 100,
and 200 total points. The measure of ethnicity is constructed using Murdock (1959).
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Murdock (1959) - Number of Ethnicities in 500km Buffers
IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Slaves .021 .022 .023 .019 .021 .019 .021 .024 .0002
(.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.025)
AgSuitability 2.230 1.164 3.412 2.011 .833 6.679
(.898)∗∗ (1.209) (2.242) (1.176)∗ (1.457) (4.938)
Population .748 .768 .782 .739 .747 .801
(.077)∗∗∗ (.110)∗∗∗ (.193)∗∗∗ (.082)∗∗∗ (.121)∗∗∗ (.219)∗∗∗
Elevation -.473 -.373 -.479 -.444 -.321 -.755
(.131)∗∗∗ (.187)∗∗ (.269)∗ (.165)∗∗∗ (.227) (.469)
Forest -10.703 -8.867 -12.918 -11.301 -10.133 -7.907
(1.687)∗∗∗ (2.357)∗∗∗ (3.750)∗∗∗ (2.669)∗∗∗ (3.889)∗∗∗ (7.759)
Desert -2.555 -1.460 -4.845 -2.340 -1.142 -8.815
(.634)∗∗∗ (.724)∗∗ (2.127)∗∗ (.976)∗∗ (1.063) (5.685)
Obs. 200 100 50 200 100 50 200 100 50
Table 4.8 The results presented in this table are calculated using OLS or 2SLS, as marked. The variables
are constructed in a 500km buffer around each of the coastal points. Specifications include totals of: 50, 100,
and 200 total points. The measure of ethnicity is constructed using Murdock (1959).
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Murdock (1959) - Number of Ethnicities (Assigned to Nearest Coastal Point)
IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Slaves .004 .002 .003 .004 .003 .002 .007 .006 .010
(.001)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗ (.0009)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗ (.001)∗ (.005) (.002)∗∗∗ (.007)
AgSuitability .597 -.176 .801 .156 -.491 -.621
(.666) (.292) (.484)∗ (.879) (.377) (1.370)
Population .101 .076 .150 .083 .057 .142
(.057)∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.042)∗∗∗ (.062) (.031)∗ (.061)∗∗
Elevation -.019 .017 -.042 .039 .067 .079
(.097) (.045) (.058) (.123) (.059) (.130)
Forest -1.803 -.142 -1.939 -3.006 -1.346 -4.121
(1.251) (.569) (.809)∗∗ (1.996) (1.007) (2.154)∗
Desert -.272 .435 -.747 .159 .737 .982
(.470) (.175)∗∗ (.459) (.729) (.275)∗∗∗ (1.578)
Obs. 200 100 50 200 100 50 200 100 50
Table 4.9 The results presented in this table are calculated using OLS or 2SLS, as marked. The environ-
mental variables are constructed in a 500km buffer around each of the coastal points. Ethnicities are only
assigned to the nearest coastal point. Specifications include totals of: 50, 100, and 200 total points. The
measure of ethnicity is constructed using Murdock (1959).
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IV First Stage - Number of Slaves Exported in 125km Buffers
(1) (2) (3)
Instrument1 -2.788 -2.663 -1.829
(1.725) (2.520) (3.442)
Instrument2 -3.059 -3.071 -2.709
(.687)∗∗∗ (.992)∗∗∗ (1.303)∗∗
AgSuitability -6.889 -5.125 -26.137
(15.199) (21.453) (30.270)
Population 2.010 1.967 .845
(.590)∗∗∗ (.819)∗∗ (.933)
Elevation -7.645 -8.758 -8.334
(2.803)∗∗∗ (4.223)∗∗ (6.499)
Forest 75.342 -32.831 200.407
(112.346) (154.868) (227.701)
Desert -50.328 -59.929 -23.442
(50.972) (74.878) (106.040)
Obs. 200 100 50
Table 4.10 The results presented in this table are the first stage results for all 125km buffer IV regressions.
The environmental variables are constructed in a 125km buffer around each of the coastal points. Ethnicities
are only assigned to the nearest coastal point. Specifications include totals of: 50, 100, and 200 total points.
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IV First Stage - Number of Slaves Exported in 250km Buffers
(1) (2) (3)
Instrument1 -7.978 -6.069 -4.445
(2.467)∗∗∗ (3.673)∗ (5.012)
Instrument2 -5.732 -5.572 -5.311
(.983)∗∗∗ (1.446)∗∗∗ (1.897)∗∗∗
AgSuitability -1.705 15.587 4.974
(21.733) (31.266) (44.073)
Population 3.528 3.270 2.504
(.843)∗∗∗ (1.194)∗∗∗ (1.359)∗
Elevation -5.533 -11.111 -13.155
(4.008) (6.155)∗ (9.462)
Forest -77.796 -144.491 153.784
(160.641) (225.710) (331.526)
Desert -221.454 -245.996 -187.540
(72.884)∗∗∗ (109.130)∗∗ (154.392)
Obs. 200 100 50
Table 4.11 The results presented in this table are the first stage results for all 250km buffer IV regressions.
The environmental variables are constructed in a 250km buffer around each of the coastal points. Ethnicities
are only assigned to the nearest coastal point. Specifications include totals of: 50, 100, and 200 total points.
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IV First Stage - Number of Slaves Exported in 500km Buffers
(1) (2) (3)
Instrument1 -12.083 -11.677 -9.406
(3.888)∗∗∗ (5.648)∗∗ (7.790)
Instrument2 -10.456 -9.980 -9.445
(1.549)∗∗∗ (2.223)∗∗∗ (2.949)∗∗∗
AgSuitability 21.612 26.981 9.094
(34.257) (48.073) (68.496)
Population 4.489 3.994 2.232
(1.329)∗∗∗ (1.836)∗∗ (2.112)
Elevation -15.972 -17.897 -17.078
(6.318)∗∗ (9.464)∗ (14.706)
Forest 793.657 566.340 1130.057
(253.206)∗∗∗ (347.034) (515.249)∗∗
Desert -415.753 -442.172 -422.868
(114.880)∗∗∗ (167.791)∗∗∗ (239.951)∗
Obs. 200 100 50
Table 4.12 The results presented in this table are the first stage results for all 500km buffer and “nearest”
IV regressions. The environmental variables are constructed in a 125km buffer around each of the coastal
points. Ethnicities are only assigned to the nearest coastal point. Specifications include totals of: 50, 100, and
200 total points.
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Peoples Atlas - Number of Ethnicities in 125km Buffers - No Overlap
IV
(1) (2) (3)
Slaves .015 .008 .026(.006)∗∗ (.006) (.019)
AgSuitability 4.381 4.253(1.032)∗∗∗ (1.127)∗∗∗
Population .096 .107(.040)∗∗ (.045)∗∗
Elevation -.449 -.316(.234)∗ (.288)
Forest -4.303 -2.454(9.209) (10.168)
Desert -15.742 -12.428(4.065)∗∗∗ (5.554)∗∗
Obs. 67 67 67
Table 4.13 The results presented in this table are calculated using OLS or 2SLS, as marked. The variables
are constructed in a 125km buffer around each of the coastal points. The observation size has been chosen to
ensure no overlap between observational units. The measure of ethnicity is constructed using Felix and Meur
(2001).
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Peoples Atlas - Number of Ethnicities in 250km Buffers - No Overlap
IV
(1) (2) (3)
Slaves .089 .036 .153(.019)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗ (.064)∗∗
AgSuitability 11.786 8.504(3.913)∗∗∗ (6.468)
Population 1.263 .705(.209)∗∗∗ (.436)
Elevation -1.322 -.084(.541)∗∗ (1.065)
Forest -15.750 -32.280(15.126) (25.562)
Desert -17.046 -6.729(7.437)∗∗ (12.967)
Obs. 40 40 40
Table 4.14 The results presented in this table are calculated using OLS or 2SLS, as marked. The variables
are constructed in a 250km buffer around each of the coastal points. The observation size has been chosen to
ensure no overlap between observational units. The measure of ethnicity is constructed using Felix and Meur
(2001).
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Peoples Atlas - Number of Ethnicities in 500km Buffers - No Overlap
IV
(1) (2) (3)
Slaves .173 .141 .315
(.053)∗∗∗ (.088) (.151)∗∗
AgSuitability 5.408 -13.594
(25.038) (31.345)
Population 7.279 3.723
(4.185)∗ (5.340)
Elevation .645 5.014
(4.513) (5.915)
Forest -34.446 -142.156
(84.054) (119.218)
Desert -4.059 7.342
(10.568) (14.227)
Obs. 19 19 19
Table 4.15 The results presented in this table are calculated using OLS or 2SLS, as marked. The variables
are constructed in a 500km buffer around each of the coastal points. The observation size has been chosen to
ensure no overlap between observational units. The measure of ethnicity is constructed using Felix and Meur
(2001).
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4.8 Appendix: Model
1. The game has an infinite number of periods and is played sequentially.
2. Each nation and village is located on an ordered line.
3. A nation may choose to do nothing, to raid a neighbouring village, or conquer a neighbouring
village. A village may choose to do nothing or form an alliance with another village.
4. The actual player is the king or chieftain of the nation or village. Payoffs reflect the utility
stream of the king or chieftain.
5. The pre-existing nation always moves first, followed by the villages. If we assume that the
nation is located on the far left of the ordered line then play proceeds from left to right along
the line.
6. The discount rate is equal to δ .
7. Each nation and village has a labor force equal to Li, which also defines the size of the nation.
8. Each nation and village has a level of labor productivity equal to bi.
9. The labor force may be used in production, raiding, or warfare. This reallocation is modeled
abstractly through the cost of raiding or war.
10. Raiding results in a cost of R, which encompasses reallocated labor and military losses.
11. Warfare requires X, which encompasses reallocated labor and military losses.
12. Raiding results in a one period payoff equal to paLi where p is the price of slaves and a is the
fraction of the village’s population enslaved.
13. If a village is conquered utility stream of its chieftain is 0 for all future periods.
14. The chieftain of a raided nation is subject to a one period utility penalty equal to S.
15. Conquest results in the conquered nations labor force being added to the conquerors.
16. If two villages choose to ally each chieftain will maintain a separate payoff stream and split
any rewards from conquest or raiding.
17. Raiding, conquest, and alliance formation may only occur between neighboring villages or
nations.
18. A nation is able to raid a village, but is unable to raid other nations.
19. Two villages may choose to join together and form an alliance with each taking a penalty
equal to ε .
20. An alliance between two villages is equivalent to them forming a nation. Once allied, these
villages may conquer or raid villages. Additionally, they may not be conquered by a nation.
The above framework is not ideal for presenting a single all-encompassing description for the
effect of the introduction of the slave trade. Rather, we present three scenarios based upon different
initial conditions and explore the impact of the introduction of the slave trade.
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